RAMCHANDRA NAGOJI KANDAM Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision application arises out of proceedings started under section 145 of Criminal Procedure Code. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Chiplun, found that Party No. 1 was in possession at the material time and passed the consequential order. Against this order, Party No. 2 preferred a revision application to the Sessions Court, Ratnagiri. The learned Sessions Judge held that in view of the decision of this Court viz. Dr. Lallubhai Bhatt v. State of Bombay, 59 Bom LR 942: (AIR 1958 Bom 276) he had no jurisdiction to entertain the above-mentioned revision application.

(2.) IN this revision application, Mr. Kode for the petitioner, i. e. party No. 2 contends that the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge is not correct, inasmuch as the judgment of the Division Bench in the abovementioned case clearly leaves the material question open. According to Mr. Kode, the material question inthis case is whether a Sub-Divisional Magistrate acting under S. 145 Cr. P. C. can be said to be an inferior Criminal Court mentioned in S. 435 (1) of Cr. P. C. In the above-mentioned reported decision the learned Chief Justice in his judgment after referring to the question as to whether a proceeding under S. 145 Cr. P. C. is a proceeding entertained by a Criminal Court observes: 'we do not think that it is necessary to decide this question in this case. In view of this observation, I have allowed Mr. Kode to argue that point. Mr Kode submits that a Sub-Divisional Magistrate acting under S. 145 Cr. P. C. is an inferior Criminal Court contemplated by Section 435 (1) of Cr. P. C. Mr. Kode refers to the heading of chapter II of Criminal Procedure Code, which is: 'of the Constitution of Criminal Courts and offices'. He then refers to Ss. 6-A and points out that while enumerating classes of Criminal Courts, Sub-Divisional Magistrates are not excluded, on the other hand the expression used is "courts of Magistrate" and that according to Mr. Kode, indicated that even Sub-divisional Magistrates, though they are grouped under the heading "executive magistrates" are inferior Criminal Courts contemplated by Section 435 (1 ). I am unable to accept this contention. It is true that the heading of Chpter II shows that the chapter deals with the constitution of Criminal Courts. All the same, S. 6 makes it quite clear that after the amendment by Bombay Act 23 of 1951, which separated the judiciary from the executive, there are only two classes of Courts, viz. Courts of Sessions and Courts of Magistrates. It is pertinent to note that S. 6-A does not use the expressin 'courts of Magistrates': it uses the expression 'classes of Magistrates'. In my opinion, S. 6-A does not deal with Criminal Courts, but it deals with only classes of Magistrates. Merely because an officer is designated as a Magistrate, it does not necessarily follow that he is constituted an inferior Criminal Court as contemplated by Section 435 (1), unless there is some specific provision to indicate that. Mr. Kode then refers to Ss. 17 and 17-A. Section 17, it is important to note, uses the expression 'judicial Magistrates' as contrasted with the expression 'executive Magistrates' used in s. 17-A. that, in my opinion, negatives the contention advanced by Mr,. Kode. Section 17 lays down that all Judicial Magistrates shall be subordinate to the sessions Judge, who shall distribute business amongst them. Section 17-A lays down that all Executive Magistrates appointed under s. 13 or S. 14 shallbe subordinate to the District Magistrate. the wording of s. 17-A makes it quite clear that the Code does make a clear distinction between Judicial Magistrates who preside over inferior Criminal Courts as contemplated by S. 435 (1) and Executive magistrates who are assigned some special executive work by some specific provision in the Criminal Procedure Code.

(3.) REFERENCE was made to S. 17b also. Mr Kode strongly relies on the expression 'courts of Magistrates' and contends that this expression would necessarily include even 'executive Magistrates'. I am unable to accept this contention also. The expression used in S. 17v is 'courts of Magistrates (including Courts of Presidency Magistrates)'. If Mr. Kode's contention that the expression 'courts of Magistrates' covers all Magistrates including even the Executive Magistrates is correct, the further expression 'including Courts of Presidency Magistrates' would be redundant. It is a well-known principle of contruction that a statute must be so construed that there is no occasion to attribute redundance or superfluity to the Legislature. In view of the wording of S. 17-B, it is, in my opinio, clear that the expression 'courts of Judicial Magistrates' refers only to courts of Judicial Magistrates, it does not include Executive Magistrates. This is made clear by adding the expression 'including Courts of Precidency Magistrates'.