JAM MANUFACTURING CO LTD Vs. SADASHIV SITARAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revisional application arises out of an ejectment proceeding taken by the plaintiff-petitioners against their tenant, one janabai Bapuji. The plaintiff gave a notice to the tenant terminating her tenancy on the ground that she was in arreears of rent from July to December 1959. the notice was given on 28th January 1960. thereafter, the petitioners filed the suit on 20th of June 1960 in the Small Cause Court at Bombay under the Rent Restriction Act. The tenant contested the proceeding. She contended that she was a tenant for about 20 years. She admitted the notice but said that after the receipt of the notice she offered part of the rent to the plaintiff as she was out of work but the plaintiff refused to accept the same and demanded all the arrears. She stated that she should be allowed to pay the rent by instalments. During the pendency of the suit, she died. The opponent was brought on record. he claimed to be the son of the deceased and also claimed that he was living in the premises and as such entitled to be a tenant. He further contended that even if the right to evict the tenant had accrued to the plaintiff, he could not be evicted in law-though there were arrears of rent as prescribed by the Act, on the ground that he acquired an independent tenancy under the Act. The learned Judge accepted these contentions and dismissed the suit. Equally, the appeal of the plaintiff failed before a Bench of Judges. the plaintiff seeks to revise these orders as being untenable.

(2.) THE right to continue as a tenant can be claimed by the opponent only under Section 5 (11) (C ). Except this definition section, which defines the Word "tenant", there is no other provision in the Act which enables a person residing with the tenant at the time of his death as a member of his family, to claim the rights of a tenant. to determine what the right of such a claimant is, one has to consider the provisions of the Act.

(3.) A tenant who continues in the property after termination of his tenancy has been consistently described as a "statutory tenant" because he is really not a tenant as the landlord does not want him and yet he enjoys most of the privileges of a tenant by reason of the statute Mr. Mulchandani very strongly relies on the decision in Keevas v. Dean; Nunn v. Pellagrini, (1924) 1 KB 685 at P. 690, Balmukund and co. ,v. Mangaldas Tribhovandas, 55 Bom LR 50; (AIR 1953 Bom 200), and Anand Nivas Private Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyanji's Pedhi, AIR 1965 SC 414, where it is held that the statutory tenant has only a personal right which cannot be inherited or assigned. He contends that this being so, it is impossible to say that the successor to the statutory tenancy under Section 5 (11) (C), whom we may conveniently call "successor" tenant, takes it by inheritance. As the new tenant takes by reason of this provision, his tenancy must be regarded as a new and independent tenancy and he is, therefore, not liable to make good the defaults of the previous tenant. This contention overlooks the fact that the statute does not by any express provision confer any such independent right upon the "new" tenant. Can such a right be inferred from the definition clause only? the "statutory tenant" is the creation of the Rent Acts and the Legislature who created such a tenant was equally entitled to make his right heritable and transmissible if it chose.