TARABAI TUKARAM SHELATKAR Vs. KAMALAKANT GOVIND DALAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application for revision arising from an application for adjustment of debts made by the applicant, who claimed that she was a debtor. The debt sought to be adjusted was supposed to be due upon a transaction of mortgage couched in the form of a sale, and the sale deed was executed by the applicant and her two sons, and upon a question being raised before the learned trial Judge as to whether the applicant was a debtor, the learned trial Judge held that she was not. In order to prove the contention that she was a debtor, the applicant had to prove under the provisions of Section 2(5)(a)(ii), that she held the land for agricultural purposes, and under Clause (in) she had been cultivating land personally for the cultivating seasons in the two years immediately preceding the date of the coming into operation of the Act, The applicant said that she had got 15 cocoanut trees, 4 mango grafts, 12 betel nut trees and she used to water them and take their fruit. The learned trial Judge even though he found that the applicant was rearing these trees said that this did not fall within the definition of 'cultivates land', and secondly he said that in any case her income from non -agricultural sources exceeded Rs. 1, 500. He, therefore, held that the applicant was not a debtor an is raissed her application. In appeal the learned appellate Judge held that the applicant was not cultivating land, and finding that she was consequently not a debtor, dimissed her appeal.

(2.) THE applicant has come in revision, and the first point which arises for determination is whether it could be said that the applicant held land used for agricultural purposes, and secondly whether she had been cultivating land personally. So far as the question of seasons is concerned, it is not in dispute that the conditions have been satisfied.

(3.) IT is contended however that even though it could be said that the applicant was cultivating the land personally when we are considering the question under Clause (ii) of Section 2(5)(a), it must be taken that agriculture does not include horticulture, because to Section 2(5)(6) there is added an Explanation, and that is For the purposes of this clause 'agriculture' includes horticulture, the raising of crops or garden produce, dairy farming, poultry farming, stock breeding and grassing, but does not include leasing of land or cutting only of wood. It is said that in case the word 'agriculture' wherever it was used in Act was intended to include horticulture, there would be no reason for the Legislature to say in Explanation I to Section 2(5)(b) that in that particular clause agriculture would include it. It has got to be remembered however that it is not as if Explanation I to Section 2(5)(b) says 'for the purpose of this clause 'agriculture' includes horticulture'. If the Explanation had stopped there, one could have understood the argument that the Explanation precluded agriculture in other parts of the statute being given a meaning which included horticulture. But it is obvious that the Legislature enacted Explanation I because it wanted to include in the word 'agriculture', which was used in Section 2(5)(b) several things, for example, dairy farming, grazing and so on. In the second instance, the explanation seems to indicate a desire to use abundant caution. For example, after using the word 'horticulture' it includes in the definition 'raising of garden produce'. Now, horticulture by definition is an art or science of cultivating or managing gardens, including the growing of flowers, fruit and vegetables, Similarly, it includes raising of crops, That is, by definition of agriculture in the dictionary, part of it. So is stock breeding. It is obvious, therefore, that the Legislature wanted to exercise abundant - caution in regard to the interpretation of the word 'agriculture' as used in Section 2(5)(b), and it may have included the word 'horticulture' in that explanation by way of abundant caution. No inference arises from the fact that it is included in the word 'agriculture' for the purposes of Clause (b) of Section 2(5) that the raising of cocoanuts or the raising of fruit trees or betel leaves is not included in the word 'agriculture' as used in other parts of the statute. It was enacted to relieve agricultural indebtedness and it is impossible to accept a meaning of the word 'agriculture' which would exclude from its purview a large number of cultivators. In my view, therefore, the applicant was a debtor, and the case will consequently have to be remanded to the learned appellate Judge for disposing of the appeal in accordance with the law. But Mr. Adarkar, who appears on behalf of the opponent, has raised before me two questions, one of which was raised even before the trial Court, that is, that this application could not be proceeded with because it comprises a suit for redemption of a mortgage and the other mortgagors, namely, the sons of the applicant had not been made parties I to the application.