AMBALAL HARJIVANDAS Vs. JANI CHANDULAL VIDYARAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS Revisional application raised a short point of limitation winch is of some importance for similar claims in the district of Baroda, The petitioner filed a suit in tile Court, of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Kadi, to recover Rs. 449/- on a promissory note. The promissory note had been executed in favour of the petitioner on 18-5-1918. On 23-6-1951 there was an acknowledgment by part-payment or the principal amount and so the petitioner's case was that the suit filed by him on 18-6-1954 was within time. The learned trial Judge has held that the suit is barred by limitation and so the petitioner's claim has been dismissed. Mr. Shastri for the petitioner contends that, in coming to the conclusion that the suit was barred by limitation, the learned Judge has misconstrued the effect of the provisions contained in Clause 12 of the Baroda State (Application of Laws) Order, 1949.

(2.) IT is common ground that a suit on a promissory note under the law of limitation prevailing in Baroda prior to its merger was governed by a rule of six years, though the corresponding law in the rest of the State of Bombay prescribes a period of three years for such a suit. After the State of Baroda merged with Bombay, the Baroda State (Application of Laws) Order 1949, was promulgated and Clause 12 of this Order has provided that,

(3.) SECTION 20 of the Limitation Act deals with the effect of payment on account of debt or interest on legacy and it provides that where payment on account of a debt is made before the expiration of the prescribed period by the person liable to pay the debt, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made. The learned trial Judge has held that the payment in question had been made, in the present case, after the expiration of the prescribed period, but within the extended period allowed for the institution of the present suit. That is why he came to the conclusion that the part-payment does not satisfy the requirements of Section 20, Limitation Act. In other words the view taken by the learned Judge appears to be that Clause 12 of the Order does not prescribe the period of limitation for suits on promissory notes but nearly gives an extended period of grace within which the promisees can sue their promisors. If Clause 12 was intended merely to afford relief to the promisees by giving them an extended period of grace, then the acknowledgment on which the petitioner relies cannot be said to satisfy the requirements of Section 20. On the other hand, if it is held that Clause 12 of the Order prescribes a period, of limitation for suits on promissory notes, then the part-payment in question would amount to a valid acknowledgment under Section 20.