LAXMIDAS DEVIDAS KAPADIA Vs. MATHURADAS DWARKADAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is one of those usual applications which seek to extend the time granted by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court for making a deposit in a summary suit. The only difference between this application and others is that it is a little more ingenious than the others we have dealt with in the past.

(2.) A civil revision application was preferred to this Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code challenging an order made by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court in a summary suit on a promissory note directing that the petitioner should make a deposit of Rs. 9, 500 by a certain date. The civil revision application was admitted by Mr. Justice Shah and the application came up for final hearing before Mr. Justice Bavdekar. At that stage the petitioner contended that he challenged the rules framed by this Court under which the provisions of Order XXXVII were made applicable to the City Civil Court and his contention was that these rules were ultra vires as they offended against Article 14 of the Constitution and also that they were invalid. Mr. Justice Bavdekar granted leave to the petitioner to amend the petition, and as it raised a constitutional question, it has come up before us for disposal.

(3.) IT has often been stated that Article 14 does not require uniformity of application of law. What Article 14 prohibits is a classification which is not upon any rational basis. Article 14 does not prevent the legislature from providing that laws shall apply differently to different parsons or to different localities if in so providing the Legislature has in mind a rational classification. Article it prohibits a classification which has no rational basis or which is in substance discriminatory in character. The very expression 'discriminatory' means that you apply one law to one party or to one locality and a different law to another party or a different locality without there being any reasonable object in doing so, and the question that we have to consider is whether, when the Legislature conferred the jurisdiction of trying summary suits only upon the High Court and left it to the High Court to apply this provision to any civil Court subordinate thereto, it was passing a law which was discriminatory in character and preventing litigants from enjoying the protection of Article 14. The very basis of summary suits is that where there is commercial litigation commercial men should get expeditious justice in respect of documents and transactions which are commercial in their nature and which require a quick disposal in order to give security and confidence to commercial men who are to a large extent responsible for the prosperity of the particular region or city where they reside and where they carry on their business or commerce. If that be the correct view of the reason why special jurisdiction with regard to summary suits is conferred upon the High Court, then it cannot be disputed that the city of Bombay is an important commercial city and that special procedure is necessary in suits involving commercial transactions in the High Court of Bombay. We have, for instance, rules with reagard to commercial causes which make it possible for those causes to be decided more quickly than ordinary long causes. If Mr. Palkhivala's contention were right, even those rules would offend against Article 14. But in our opinion there is a clear logical reason why the Legislature enacting the Civil Procedure Code conferred this special power upon the High Court with regard to summary suits.