LAWS(BOM)-1955-9-87

SANTAN FERNANDES Vs. B P INDIA LTD

Decided On September 27, 1955
SANTAN FERNANDES Appellant
V/S
B.P. (INDIA) LTD., BOMBAY Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal by the original applicant, and it raises point of law whether the accident which resulted in the death of the applicant's son who was a scullion on a ship arose in the course of, and out of, his employment with the opposite party. Can a legal inference be drawn from the nature of the deceased's employment that the said employment was a proximate cause of a heat stroke from which he suffered and on account of which he lost of life ? If an employee works under cover, if the nature of his employment does not expose him directly to the rays of the sun, if the atmospheric temperature is 101 Degree but the nature of the employment as a scullion requires the employee to move suddenly from the law temperature of a cold storage room to the atmospheric temperature of 101 Degree and even higher temperature of a kitchen and if, while doing that duty, he suffers from heat stroke and dies, is a legal inferences permissible that the accident arose out of his employment and was not due to the general weather conditions to which not only the employees but all others in the same place were subject ? These are questions which we have to answer in this case.

(2.) THE facts which have given rise to this appeal may now be stated. The application has been made to recover a sum of Rs. 3,500 from the opposite party, B. P. (India), Ltd. , as compensation in respect of the death of the applicant's son Joaquim Fernandes. Joaquim Fernandes was in the employment of the opposite party as a scullion on the s. s. "british Chemist. " His duties were (1) to wash the dishes, utensils and crockery; (2) to convey food from the kitchen to the pantry; and (3) to assist in serving morning tea to the officers in their cabins. While he was performing those duties on 28 July, 1953, when the ship was near Bahrein, he suffered from a heat stroke and collapsed. He went into coma. His temperature rose to 110 Degree. He was removed to the ice room, artificial respiration was resorted to but he died. The applicant's contention is that the mishap of the heat stroke which resulted in the death of her son occurred when the deceased was in the course of the employment of the opposite party, and it arose out of the said employment and it arose out of the employment and therefore the opposite party is liable to pay compensation. In the written statement filed by the opposite party, the opposite party has denied that the accident arose out of and in the course of, the employment of the deceased. According to the opposite party, the deceased party, the deceased died of a natural cause, viz. , a heat stroke. The opposite party contends that the heat stroke was merely a consequence of the severity of the weather; that the deceased was not specially affected by the severity of the weather by reason of his employment; that his work did not in any manner contribute to his death. Accordingly, the opposite party submits that it is not liable to pay compensation to the applicant.

(3.) THE learned Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation observed in the course of his order that no evidence was led on behalf of the applicant to show that the work of the deceased exposed him to special risk of heat stroke. The learned Commissioner said that the deceased scullion has to work and under cover, that he was not exposed to the rays of the sun or the heat of the engine room or the heat of the kitchen and that the character of his employment "was not such as to create or intensify the risks that arise from extraordinary natural causes. " The learned Commissioner came to the conclusion that the employment of the deceased did not expose him "to some peculiar or extraordinary danger" and therefore it could not be said that he died of an injury by accident. In this view, "the death of the deceased was not due to injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. " Accordingly he dismissed the application. From that order, the applicant has appealed.