LAXMIDAS RANCHHODDAS Vs. SAVITABAI HARGOVINDAS SHAH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal raises a rather important question as to the authority of counsel to enter into a compromise on behalf of his client. The plaintiffs filed a suit, in which the compromise is alleged to have been arrived at, to eject the defendant who they alleged was a licensee. The suit appeared as a short cause before Coyajee, J. This was on 22-6-1954. Before the suit reached hearing terms of settlement, were discussed between the defendant and her husband and the solicitors on the two sides, and it was agreed that the suit should be placed at the bottom of the list so that the consent terms may be handed in. At 4 p. m. the suit reached hearing and counsel for the plaintiffs, Mr. Laud, and counsel for the defendant. Mr. Bhat, applied to the Court that the suit should be placed at the bottom of the list as negotiations were going on. The learned Judge was not prepared to place the suit at the bottom of the list and asked the parties to discuss the matter in Court. Thereupon the plaintiffs and the defendant and her husband and the attorneys discussed the matter further in the corridor of the Court and the solicitors of the plaintiffs informed Mr. Laud as to what the consent terms were which had been arrived at, and the consent terms were that time was to be given to the defendant to vacate upto 31-3-1955,that the compensation payable up to the end of May, 1954, was Rs. 1,200 and the same was payable by monthly instalments, and future -compensation was to be payable at the rate of Rs. 150 on the 10th day of every month, and it was further agreed that there was to be a clause for possession, a default clause, and a clause with regard to payment of costs. Mr. Laud mentioned to the Court that these were the terms agreed upon and he also asked the learned Judge that the suit should be placed the following day on board for a consent decree. The two solicitors then met and drew up more fully the terms of settlement and the two solicitors and Mr. Bhat counsel for the defendant asked Mr. Laud to draw up these terms in a proper formal shape. It was then agreed that Mr. Bhat and the solicitors should attend Mr. Laud's chambers, which are in the High Court, at 6 p. m. to look through the terms which were to be drafted by Mr. Laud.

(2.) THE terms which were handed over to Mr. Laud, and it should be noted banded over by the plaintiffs' solicitors, defendant's solicitors and the defendant's counsel, contained, besides the terms already mentioned to Court, a specific term that the defendant should pay the costs of the suit fixed at Rs. 300 and also a default clause that in default of payment of two compensation amounts the decree for ejectment was to be executed immediately. Mr. Laud drew up the terms and Mr. Bhat attended his chambers and the final consent terms were approved by Mr. Bhat on behalf of his client. These terms were engrossed and a copy of the terms was sent to the solicitors of the defendant. When the suit was called out before Coyajee J. on 23-6-1954, for the taking of a consent decree, a new counsel appeared on behalf of the defendant, Mr. M. R. Mody, and he informed the Court that the defendant was not agreeable to the consent terms which had been forwarded to the defendant's attorneys. Thereupon Coyajee J. directed the plaintiffs to take out a notice of motion for recording the compromise. Accordingly a notice of motion was taken out, and the learned Judge has dismissed the notice of motion, and the plaintiffs have now conic in appeal.

(3.) NOW, the defendant does not dispute that the terms with regard to the amount of compensation in arrears and the compensation to be paid in future were agreed to by her. She says that the time within which she had to vacate was not agreed to by her and that she also had not agreed to the default clause provided in the consent terms. In the final consent terms, it may be mentioned, there is one other term and that is that the defendant has to pay electric charges in respect of the premises. We may dispose of this question with regard to this term shortly because it is clear that if the defendant was to continue as a licensee she would be under an obligation to pay the electric charges. Therefore, this obligation was implicit in the con. sent terms which were handed over to Mr. Laud by Mr. Bhat and the solicitors. Therefore, even if this term was not incorporated in the formal consent terms, there would have been an obligation in law upon the defendant to pay the electric charges. Therefore, all that can be said about this term is that what was implied in the original consent terms was made express in these formal consent terms.