P D SHAMDASANI Vs. KING-EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal from an order of the High Court of Bombay made by Kania J. adjudging that the appellant was guilty of a contempt of Court, committing him to prison for three months, and ordering him to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000, On the day after the order was made the appellant applied to the learned Judge for a modification of the sentence expressing sincere and unreserved regret for having used the expressions which were held to be a contempt, and the sentence was then reduced to one of eight days imprisonment but no alteration was made in the fine The sentence of imprisonment was served and the appellant then applied to the High Court in its appellate criminal jurisdiction for a certificate that the case was one fit for appeal to His Majesty in Council under Clause 41 of the amended Letters Patent of 1865. THIS application was opposed by the Advocate General, who submitted there was no jurisdiction to grant it, as it was said that the clause in question did not apply to a committal for contempt of Court The High Court (Beaumont C. J. and Sen J.) held that there was jurisdiction to grant a certificate and that it was a proper case in which to do so, and this was accepted as right by counsel for the respondent before this Board, and their Lordships accordingly do not think it necessary to express any opinion upon this matter.

(2.) THE appellant had been an unsuccessful plaintiff in a suit in the High Court and had been ordered to pay costs. THEy were taxed and the appellant then took out a summons to review the taxation, and, though a layman, appeared in person to support his objections. In the course of the hearing counsel opposing stated that the appellant was misleading the Court as to the nature of the issues raised in the action and insisted that he should read out a paragraph in the plaint. THE appellant then said: I do not keep anything back at all. My fault is that I disclose everything, unlike members of the bar, who are in the habit of not doing so and misleading the Court. This caused a protest from the opposing counsel, Mr. M. V. Desai, whereupon the appellant immediately apologised and expressed his regret for having used ah unfortunate expression in the heat of argument. Later in dealing with the Taxing Master's statement, with regard to the allowance of discretionary items, that he had taken into consideration all the matters mentioned in Rule 563, the appellant said: It is customary for the Taxing Masters to write what is written at the end of the paragraph, but is it considered at all ? No protest or observation on this statement was made either by bench or bar at the time when it was uttered, nor when judgment was given, and it appears to their Lordships that it must have been regarded as no more than the sort of tactless and intemperate statement that is not infrequently made in the heat of argument and not only by litigants in person. On October 13, 1942, the appellant concluded his argument and the Court proceeded to give judgment but had not finished doing so at the end of the day. At the rising of the Court Mr. Desai stated that he would draw the attention of the Court to the statement made by the appellant with reference to the bar and would apply that appropriate action be taken. On the next day both Mr. Desai and the Advocate General of Bombay appeared, and, though the appellant again apologised and expressed regret for what he had said, moved the Court to punish the appellant for a contempt in using the language he did regarding the bar. In the course of the argument the learned Judge himself then raised the question as to the words the appellant had used relating to the Taxing Masters. On the following day the learned Judge delivered a lengthy judgment, reviewing some authorities, and, corning to the conclusion that the appellant had been guilty of a contempt both in his reflections on the bar and on the Taxing Masters, made the order against which this appeal is brought.

(3.) THEIR Lordships would once again emphasise what has often been said before, that this summary power of punishing for contempt should be used sparingly and only in serious cases. It is a power which a Court must of necessity possess; its usefulness depends on the wisdom and restraint with which it is exercised, and to use it to suppress methods of advocacy which are merely offensive is to use it for a purpose for which it was never intended. The bar can surely maintain its dignity and prestige without having to invoke this jurisdiction.