RAVINDRA LAXMAN BOROLE Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The present case raises an important question concerning the appellate and revisional remedies under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 ("MLRC"). During the hearing, it became apparent that there is a direct conflict of interpretation in the judgments of this Court regarding the scope of appeal and revision against an order condoning delay and admitting an appeal under the MLRC. The conflicting views expressed in several decisions by coordinate Benches have created uncertainty in the application of Ss. 251, 252, 255, 257, and 259 of the MLRC.

(2.) Mr. Karandikar, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the judgments delivered in Writ Petition No. 5716 of 2024 and Writ Petition No. 12965 of 2023 have failed to properly appreciate the legal position arising under Sec. 252 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code"). According to him, Sec. 252 merely bars the remedy of an appeal from certain orders enumerated therein. However, the said sec. does not declare such orders as final and conclusive for all legal purposes. He argued that a mere bar on appeal does not ipso facto clothe the order with the attribute of finality. In contrast, the Legislature has, in several provisions of the Code, expressly employed the expressions "final" and "conclusive" while declaring the effect of certain orders. In this regard, reliance was placed on Sec. 259 of the Code, which, according to learned counsel, comes into operation only when the provision under which the order or decision is passed expressly declares it to be "final" or "conclusive." It was pointed out that Sec. 252 does not contain the said expressions. Therefore, the inference drawn in the earlier decisions equating bar of appeal with finality and conclusiveness is legally untenable. Learned counsel submitted that Ss. 21(5), 137(4), and 162(2) of the Code clearly specify that the orders passed under those provisions are final, whereas Ss. 23, 52(2), 175, 218(5), and 270(2) declare the orders passed therein to be conclusive. In contrast, Sec. 252 does not use either of these expressions, thereby indicating the legislative intent to merely bar an appeal without conferring absolute finality.

(3.) He further submitted that Sec. 259, which appears to operate as a limitation on the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the State Government under Sec. 257, has been erroneously interpreted in a restrictive sense. It was argued that Sec. 259 is essentially a clarificatory provision and not a source of power. Its purpose is to clarify that even where a provision declares an order or decision to be final or conclusive, the revisional power under Sec. 257 may still be exercised unless expressly excluded. He contended that Sec. 257 confers a wide power of revision on the State Government and revenue officers, which includes scrutiny of not only the legality but also the propriety and regularity of proceedings. Hence, to say that Sec. 259 limits Sec. 257 in the absence of the words "final and conclusive" is a misreading of the scheme of the Code. Referring to Sec. 255, learned counsel urged that the said provision merely outlines the stages at which the appellate authority may pass orders. It has no bearing on the revisional powers under Sec. 257. The revisional jurisdiction under Sec. 257 is independent, both in character and purpose, and cannot be curtailed merely by reference to procedural Sec. such as Ss. 251 or 255. He emphasized that amended Sec. 257(4) makes it clear that revisional jurisdiction is conferred concurrently on revenue officers and the State Government, and such jurisdiction can be exercised by either, though only once. Moreover, the order condoning delay does not become immune from revision merely because it is procedural. The power under Sec. 257(1) permits examination even of such orders for their legal correctness, propriety, and procedural regularity.