LAWS(BOM)-2025-6-164

MAHARASHTRA STATE Vs. RAJKUMAR T.

Decided On June 25, 2025
MAHARASHTRA STATE Appellant
V/S
Rajkumar T. Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The issue involved in both the petitions is common and therefore is being decided through common judgment. However for the sake of convenience, the facts of Writ Petition No. 8277/2019 are considered.

(2.) The petitioner permitted the predecessor of the respondent namely Shri Tejumarl Sawlani to occupy premises admeasuring 2048 Sq.Ft. for running Canteen. The allotment was made through tender in November, 1993. Tejumal Sawlani expired in November, 1999. The respondents, legal heirs applied for renewal of licence in their favour. The respondents, however, neither completed necessary formalities nor cleared dues and, therefore, licence came to be terminated with effect from and on 25/2/2003. The respondents did not vacate the premises and, accordingly, in October, 2003, the petitioner, applied for eviction and for recovery of dues under the provisions of the Maharashtra Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1956 (Hence, referred to as Act of 1956). The authority under the Act i.e. the Resident Deputy Collector dismissed the proceedings vide order dtd. 8/11/2011. The petitioner preferred appeal under Sec. 7 of the Act of 1956.

(3.) It will be appropriate to mention here that under Sec. 4 of the Act of 1956, the competent authority is empowered to pass an order of eviction against the occupiers of the Government premises for the reasons set out in the said Sec. . Sec. 5 provides for assessment of damages payable by a person, who has unauthorizedly occupied Government premises. Sec. 7 provides for appeal from order passed by the competent authority under Sec. 4 or 5 of the Act of 1956. It provides limitation of 30 days from the date of service of notice relating to order passed under Sec. 4(1) or under Sec. 5(1) or 5(2) of the Act of 1956. The proviso to sub- sec. 2 of Sec. 7 of the Act of 1956 provides that the appellate authority may entertain the appeal after expiry of the said period of 30 days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing appeal in time.