NABHAKUMAR Vs. ABHISHEK KRISHNA AND ORS.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) By the present proceedings the petitioner seeks appropriate action being taken against the respondents for passing contradictory orders thereby disobeying the order dated 25.02.2014 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.216/2014. By said order dated 25.02.2014 this Court had permitted the present petitioner to operate the licence in question by keeping accounts of the business and by making payment of revenue to the government on regular basis till the decision of the dispute or the appeal or as the case may be by the Competent Authority.

(2.) Shri S.S. Voditel, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that by order dated 25.02.2014 passed in Writ Petition No.216/2014 this Court had found that after the death of the original licencee, the present petitioner had been running the shop in question. There was a dispute amongst the legal heirs of the original grantee and the licence in question came to be suspended by relying upon Clause 10 of Circular dated 20.08.1996. It was submitted that this Court found that it was not in the interest of either party to keep the shop closed and hence, the petitioner was permitted to operate the said licence by maintaining accounts and making payment of revenue to the State on regular basis. He submitted that despite aforesaid order the respondent no.1 on 30.04.2014 passed an order holding that the licence in question was liable to be suspended pending adjudication of disputes between the legal heirs. The licence accordingly came to be suspended on 01.05.2014. It was submitted that this order was then challenged before the Appellate Authority and the respondent no.2 decided the appeal and maintained the order passed by the respondent no.1 on 03.03.2015. According to the learned counsel, in terms of the order passed by this Court the petitioner was entitled to continue to operate the licence till the dispute between the legal heirs was resolved amicably and hence, the respondents by not considering aforesaid order of this Court in its letter and spirit directed closure of the shop by suspending the licence. According to the learned counsel this conduct on the part of the respondents while passing aforesaid orders amounted to wilful disobedience of the order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.216/2014 thereby rendering the said respondents liable for having committed civil contempt under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It was submitted that the aforesaid order was very much within the knowledge of said respondents and they were duty bound to have followed the same in its true letter and spirit while deciding the proceedings. The learned counsel referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in All Bengal Excise Licensees Association v. Raghabendra Singh and others, 2007 11 SCC 374 to urge that the respondents ought to have understood the implication of the order passed by this Court and failure to do so rendered them liable for action of having committed contempt. He also submitted that despite filing of affidavits on record the respondents had not chosen to purge the contempt.

(3.) Mrs. Bharati Dangre, the learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents opposed aforesaid contentions. According to her, the respondents did not commit any contempt whatsoever when they decided the proceedings vide orders dated 30.04.2014 and 03.03.2015. The learned counsel referred to the order passed by this Court in the aforesaid writ petition and submitted that it was clear from reading of said order that the petitioner was permitted to operate the licence only till the decision of the proceedings between the parties. She submitted that as the dispute amongst the legal heirs continued, the direction to suspend the licence pending such adjudication was in accordance with the provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1959 as well as the Circular dated 20.08.1996. It was, therefore, denied that passing of aforesaid orders resulted in wilful disobedience of the order dated 25.02.2014 passed by this Court. It was also submitted that without challenging the aforesaid orders in appropriate proceedings, the petitioner had sought to invoke contempt jurisdiction of this Court.