NITABAI AND ORS. Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) By this appeal under Sec. 23 of the Railways Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, the original applicants are challenging the judgment and order passed by the learned Railway Claims Tribunal, Nagpur on 16.3.2006 thereby rejecting their claim for compensation under Sec. 123(C)(2) or of the Railways Act, 1989 on account of death of Rajeshsinh Thakur, due to an untoward incident occurred at Manmad Railway station on 3/10/2002.

(2.) For the sake of convenience, parties would be referred to in their original capacity. Brief facts are thus: - -

(3.) Shri Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that Spot Panchanama shows that the body of the deceased was lying just 25 feet away from platform No. 4 with both feet amputated. He further submitted that as the dead body was found within the railway premises, the learned Tribunal ought to have concluded that the deceased was bona fide passenger. As his death is required to be established by running over by railway train, the presumption that death was because of untoward incident ought to have been drawn by the Tribunal. In his submission, the evidence of Pratapsingh Chauhan, an eye witness to the incident ought to have been accepted by the learned Tribunal for establishing death of Rajeshsinh in an untoward incident. Shri Agrawal learned counsel relied upon judgments of the Delhi High Court in Sudha Chaudhari and others v/s. Union of India : III (2014) ACC 281 and Surendra Prasad and another v/s. Union of India : II (2014) ACC 932 as well as judgment of Rajasthan High court, in the matter of Union of India v/s. Harinarayan,, AIR 2007 Rajasthan 13, while arguing that burden to prove that the deceased was not bona fide passenger was on the respondent. According to learned counsel for the applicant, so far as train timings are concerned, exactitude can not be demanded. What is relevant is the death in an untoward incident. By relying on the judgment of the Supreme court in Union of India v/s. Prabhakaran Vijay Kumar, AIR 2009 (Supp) 383 he argued that provisions of a welfare legislation needs to be construed liberally in order to advance justice.