(1.) THIS is appeal against acquittal of respondents - original accused (hereinafter referred as "accused") under Sections 498 -A, 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C. for short). Respondent No. 2 Kaushalya died during pendency of the appeal and the appeal abated against her.
(2.) RESPONDENTS - accused were tried before Ad -hoc Assistant Sessions Judge, Parbhani in Sessions Trial No. 83/2001 and came to be acquitted on 3.7.2001. Against the acquittal, present appeal was filed by State which was admitted.
(3.) I have heard learned A.P.P. for the State and counsel for respondents No. 1 and 3 - the accused. According to learned A.P.P., prosecution had brought on record evidence of P.W.1 Ashroba Chavan, the father, P.W.2 Bhagwan Chavan, the cousin brother of victim Parvatabai as well as P.W.4 Baburao Kaldate, person residing near the house of accused to prove that the victim was being given ill -treatment amounting to cruelty and in spite of such evidence, the accused persons were acquitted. Learned A.P.P. submitted that, there were two dying declarations. The first short dying declaration Exh. 25 was recorded by Special Executive Magistrate Shaikh Khurshid (P.W.6), which was endorsed by the doctor P.W.10 Dr. Balasaheb Masare. The second dying declaration was recorded in the morning by the Head Constable Vasantrao Jadhav (P.W.9) which also was endorsed by the doctor P.W.5 Dr. Hamid. According to the A.P.P., in both the dying declarations the victim had informed that she was being ill -treated by the accused persons and thus, she had burnt herself. The A.P.P. argued that, the trial Court wrongly found that there was difference in the two dying declarations Exh. 23 and Exh. 25. According to her, P.W.4 Baburao Kaldate was wrongly disbelieved on the ground that although he was knowing about the ill -treatment to the victim, he had not complained to the Police Patil or others. A.P.P. argued that, the trial Court did not hold that the incident was accidental. According to the A.P.P., the accused persons should have been convicted. She submitted that, the first dying declaration Exh. 25 was not in details and so, Exh. 23 had to be recorded. The death occurred within seven years of marriage and there was evidence of ill -treatment, which included demands for money and the victim was taunted. She relied on the judgment of Najjam Faroqui v. State, reported in : 1992 CRI.L.J. 2574 to submit that conviction can be based even on dying declaration without seeking corroboration.