LAWS(BOM)-2005-6-77

BHIMRAO RAMBHAU ABHANG Vs. KOHINOOR ENGINEERING COMPANY

Decided On June 10, 2005
BHIMRAO RAMBHAU ABHANG, SINCE DECEASED BY HIS HEIR AND LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE Appellant
V/S
KOHINOOR ENGINEERING COMPANY Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Award passed by the Labour Court dated 3-2- 1994 in Reference (IDA) No. 660 of 1983 has been challenged in this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The relevant facts briefly stated are as under.

(2.) The original petitioner was working with the respondent-company, a partnership firm since June, 1961 as a helper and subsequently he was appointed as a watchman. It appears that on or about 8-4-1983 the respondent employer had lodged police complaint regarding theft of certain articles on the premises. The workmen were called for interrogation by the Inspector of nagpada Police Station and on the next day the workmen reported to the work at 9 a. m. as usual and were allowed to join the duty. It is alleged that at about 12.15 noon the petitioner was called by Chinubhai Gandhi in his chamber and asked to submit his resignation which the petitioner-workman declined. On 10-4-1983 when he reported for duty, he was not allowed to enter the factory premises. He, therefore, approached the office of the Commissioner of Labour and as there was no response from the employer the failure report came to be submitted by the Conciliation Officer on or about 24-8- 1983. The State Government, therefore, referred the issue of reinstatement with backwages and continuity of service for adjudication to the Labour court at Mumbai which came to be registered as Reference (IDA) No. 660 of 1983. The petitioner submitted his statement of claim on or about 20-3-1984 but inspite of the notices the employer did not appear on several occasions and, therefore, on 20th July 1984 the reference was allowed ex parte by the learned Presiding Officer, III Labour Court, Bombay. The employer applied for restoration of the reference and the application made some time in September 1984 was allowed. Thereafter for the first time on 28-4-1986 the employer filed its written statement opposing the reference and stated that it had not terminated the employee-petitioner and on the contrary he had left on his own accord. The Labour Court after considering the evidence adduced by both the parties and after hearing the rival arguments held that the workman failed to prove that he was illegally removed from service, and on the contrary held that he had voluntarily remained absent from work. Under the circumstances, as per the Labour Court, the issue of reinstatement in service did not survive. The Labour Court referred to letter dated 22-4-1983 (Exhibit C-11) , letter dated 11-5-1983 (Sr. No. 2 to Exhibit C-4) and the letter dated 11-7-1983 (Sr. No. 3 to Exhibit C-11). Thus the purported evidence by the employer was accepted by the Labour court in support of its findings that the workman had voluntarily abandoned the service and there was no termination of service.

(3.) Mr. Patil, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the story made out by the employer regarding voluntary abandonment was subsequently cooked up and the employer did not appear before the conciliation Officer in spite of specific notices having been received, no written statement was filed before the reference was allowed by an ex parte award and the allegation of voluntary abandonment of service was taken up for the first time in the written statement filed in the year 1986 and that was without any evidence. He further submitted that the letters relied upon by the Labour court and as referred to hereinabove could not have been treated as an evidence reliable in support of the employer's contentions to hold that the petitioner had voluntarily left the service. In the alternative Mr. Patil submits that even if the Labour Court had an occasion to consider the issue of voluntary abandonment of service, it was necessary for the Labour Court to consider whether the principles of natural justice were followed by the employer. In short it was submitted that the termination of service could not be resorted to on account of voluntary abandonment of service unless the principles of natural justice were duly complied with as has been held in the case of (Robert D'souza v. Executive Engineer Southern Railway) 1982 (1) L. L. J. 330 and in the case of (D. K. Yadavv. J. M. A. Industries Ltd. ) , 1993 (11) L. L. J. 696.