BRAHMAN SAHAYAK SANGH Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Heard. The petitioners challenge the acquisition proceedings on the ground of non-compliance of section 5a of the land Acquisition Act, 1894, hereinafter referred to as "the said Act" inasmuch as that neither the petitioners were given personal hearing in spite of objections being filed to the Notification under section 4, nor the objections which were available for consideration prior to submission of the report were considered while making report on section 5a inquiry. Reliance is sought to be placed in the decisions in the matter of Shri Mandir Sita Ramji vs. Governor of Delhi, reported in AIR 1974 SC 1868, Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad and another vs. The Municipal corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and another, reported in AIR 1976 SC 2095, Khushalrao Tulshiramji Pandao and others vs. State of Maharashtra and others, reported in 2001 (4) Mh. L. J. 510, Vinayak Gopal Limaye vs. Laxman kashinath Athavale, reported in Vol. 58 1956 Bombay Law Reporter 592 and Tej kaur and others vs. State of Punjab and others, reported in AIR 2003 SC 2414 as well as Francisco Ferreira Martins and others vs. Union of India and others, reported in AIR 1985 Bombay 312. The proceedings are sought to be justified on the ground that the objections were filed beyond the period of limitation and there was no obligation on the part of the authorities to consider the objections which were filed beyond the period of limitation.

(2.) Few facts relevant for the decision are that, Notification under section 4 was issued on 24-12-1992 and a personal Notice regarding the proposed requisition was served upon the petitioners on 6-1-1993. The petitioners by letter dated 18-1-1993 asked for certain time to file their say on the ground that on account of riots, they were not able to file the objection within time. The time was sought to be extended further by another letter dated 28-2-1993 and thereafter objections were filed under the letter dated 30-3-1993. The declaration under section 6 was issued on 24-12-1993. Thereafter the Notice under section 9 (3) was issued on 28-3-1994. Same was replied by the petitioners without claiming any compensation but informing about the breach of the provisions comprised under section 5a of the said Act by the concerned authorities. Thereafter the present petition came to be filed and as there was stay granted to the proceedings, no award has been passed in the matter.

(3.) As regards the contention about failure on the part of the authorities to give opportunity to the petitioners of being heard in the matter pursuant to the objections filed to the Notification under section 4 and before conclusion of the section 5a inquiry, it is an undisputed fact that the Notification under section 4 was issued on 24-12-1992 and thereafter a personal Notice dated 28-12-1992 was served upon the petitioners on 6-1-1993. The section 5a clearly provides that a person interested in the land sought to be acquired has to file the objections if any, within 30 days from the date of publication of the Notification. Obviously, therefore, in terms of the statutory provisions, the petitioners ought to have filed their objections on or before 22-1-1993. Assuming that the personal Notice served on 6-1-1993 has to be considered as the date of commencement of the period of limitation of 30 days, the petitioners in that case were required to file their objections on or before 5-2-1993. It is an admitted fact that no such objections were filed either within the period prescribed by the statutory provisions for filing of the objections by the concerned parties before the concerned authorities or on or before 5-2-1993. In the absence of the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 to such proceedings, there is no power vested in the authorities to extend the period of limitation. Even assuming that the authorities in such cases by sheer ignorance of the provisions of law or for any other reason whatsoever extend the period of limitation and allows the parties to file the objections beyond the period prescribed under the statutory provisions comprised under section 5a, then it may not forbid the concerned authorities from taking into consideration such objections, however, that cannot create any right in favour of such parties nor an obligation upon the concerned authorities to hear the persons filing such objections beyond the statutory period of limitation prescribed under section 5a. Being so, assuming that the request of the petitioners for extension of the time was acceded to by the concerned authorities and further time was granted to file the objections, then those objections could have been considered by the authorities if they had found those objections worth considering, but that cannot create a right in favour of the petitioners to contend that the petitioners were entitled to be heard as a matter of right in an inquiry under section 5a. None of the decisions sought to be relied upon discloses any law having been laid down contrary to the view that we are taking in the matter. Certainly an inquiry under section 5a without hearing the objectors, in case where the objections are filed within the period of limitation, would be bad in law and would vitiate the proceedings. However, when the objections are filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the statute, there is no obligation upon the authorities to grant personal hearing to such objectors.