POONVASI Vs. CROWN SILK WEAVING INDUSTRIES

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE writ petition has been filed by the twelve workmen whose services came to an end as a result of closure of the establishment of the respondent No. 1, Crown Silk Weaving Industries. The petitioners and some other workmen had filed an application before the Labour Court challenging the closure of their services and claiming reinstatement in service with full back wages and continuity of service. The Labour Court held the discontinuance of service of the petitioners as illegal and directed the employer to pay each of the twelve workmen token back wages at the rate of Rs. 200/ - per month from 15 January, 1980 till the date of order of the Labour Court i.e., 17 April, 1985. It also directed the employer to give the said workmen continuity in service from 15 January 1980 till the date of the above order for the purpose of computing all benefits arising under the service rules like gratuity, retrenchment compensation, leave wages etc. The employer was also directed to pay each of the workman one month's notice wages at the rate of wages drawn by them before 15th January, 1980 and all other claims like retrenchment compensation, gratuity, leave wages etc., by treating them to have continued in service till the date of its order. The employers appealed to the Industrial Court, Maharashtra, Bombay, which by its order dated 7 March, 1989 held that the closure of the establishment on 15 January, 1980 was genuine. The Industrial Court observed that the provision of Section 25 -O were not applicable as the number of workmen employed by the employer was less than 100. It however found that no notice as contemplated by Section 25 -FFF(1) was given to the workmen. It was further held that the Labour Court was not justified in awarding back wages at the rate of Rs. 200 per month and directing continuity of service for the purpose of gratuity etc. The Industrial Court therefore set aside the direction of the Labour Court to pay back wages at the rate of Rs. 200 per month from 15 January 1980 to 17 April 1985 to each of the workmen so also the order to give continuity of service to the workmen during the above period. The employer was directed to pay two months notice wages at the rate of wages last drawn by each of the workmen before 15 January 1980 and also closure compensation and other legal dues as per Section 25 -FFF(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The workmen have challenged the above order of the Industrial Court dated 7 March, 1989 by filing the present writ petition.

(2.) MR . N. M. Ganguli, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the Industrial Court was not justified in passing the impugned order and setting aside the direction of the Labour Court to pay to each of the workmen (petitioners herein) back wages at the rate of Rs. 200 per month. The submission of Mr. Ganguli is that to close an undertaking, the employer is required to comply with the requirements of Section 25 -FFA of the Industrial Disputes Act and in the event of failure to do so, the entire action of closure would be void and non -est and the automatic consequence would be that the workmen would be deemed to be in the employment of the employer till there is a valid closure in accordance with law by complying with the requirements of Section 25 -FFA of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the instant case, there is no dispute that sixty days' notice contemplated under Section 25 -FFA of the intention to close down the undertaking had not been given by the employer before closing down the undertaking on 15 January 1980. Therefore, the question that arises for consideration is whether the closure of an undertaking without issuing sixty days notice required by Section 25 -FFA would be illegal from its very inception. The real controversy, in other words, is in regard to the consequences of non -compliance with the requirements of Section 25 -FFA.

(3.) I have carefully considered the rival submissions. The material facts of the case are brief and mostly uncontroverted. Admittedly on 15 January, 1980, respondent No. 1 closed down the undertaking in which the petitioners were employed along with three other undertakings in which it has substantial interest. Only one of the undertakings was not closed. It was contended by the respondent No. 1 that all these undertakings were owned by different partnership firms and were different establishments. No partnership deeds were however produced by the respondent No. 1. The Labour Court observed that the employer failed to show that those five undertakings were different and recorded a finding that there was integrity of business of those five undertakings and they constituted one establishment. The Industrial Court also confirmed the above finding of the Labour Court and held that ownership of the five undertakings was common. It may be observed that no counter has been filed in this case by the respondent -employer challenging any of the concurrent factual findings arrived at by both the Courts below. The finding regarding integrity of business being primarily and essentially a finding of fact, it is for him, who wants to challenge it, to do so by specifically pointing out the factual inaccuracies which have resulted in a wrong finding. The employer has not done so. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the Labour Court and the Industrial Court should have issued notices to the different firms before arriving at the above finding. This contention has also been raised for the first time in course of reply to the arguments of the petitioners and not even by a counter to the writ petition. In such a situation, it is difficult to entertain this submission. There is no doubt that the respondent No. 1 in this case is having substantial interest in all four undertakings. Respondent No. 1 was all throughout represented in the proceedings before the Labour Court as well as the Industrial Court. It could have represented other firms and objected to all of them being treated as one establishment or in the alternative, prayed to the Court to issue notices to those firms or undertakings. Nothing of the sort appears to have been done at any stage in course of proceedings before the Courts below. Under the circumstances, I do not think it fit and proper to entertain such a technical objection at this juncture without any factual foundation to support the same.