LAWS(BOM)-1984-3-56

DADARAO UMAJI KELODE Vs. MAHARASHTRA ROAD TRANSPORT

Decided On March 22, 1984
Dadarao Umaji Kelode Appellant
V/S
Maharashtra Road Transport Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) SON of the applicant by name Vishwanath was crushed under the wheels of a bus owned by non-applicant No. 1 on 20-4-1978 and died on the spot. On 4-5-1979 the applicant preferred a claim before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal at Buldana under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Since he did not prefer the claim within a period of six months as prescribed Sub-section (3) of Section 110-A of the said Act, he filed a separate application for condoning the delay of 7 months and 3 days in preferring the claim. In this application he averred that because of sudden death of his son he was in a confused state of mind and hence he did not prefer the claim within time. This application was opposed by non-applicant No. 1. It put on record some letters which the applicant had written to it prior to his preferring the claim before the Tribunal and demanding compensation for the death of his son. The applicant had supported his averments in the application by an affidavit. The Tribunal by its order passed on 4-7-1980 rejected the application for condonation of delay on the ground that the letters which had been written by the applicant to non-applicant No. 1 on 25-9-1978 and 2-10-1978 showed that he was aware of his right to claim compensation for the death of his son and his assertion in the affidavit that he was utterly confused was belied. It is against this order that the present revision application has been preferred by the applicant.

(2.) MR . B.N. Mohta, the learned Counsel for the applicant, submits that the Tribunal has taken too technical a view in holding that the applicant had not established any sufficient cause for condoning the delay. He further submits that though the applicant had supported his averments by an affidavit, there was no counter affidavit filed by non-applicant No. 1 and that the Tribunal had relied on the two letters referred to hereinabove without these letters having been proved.

(3.) AT any rate the question whether the applicant was prevented from making the application for claim within time due to sufficient cause would be a question of fact and in this revision application finding on the question of fact cannot be disturbed even if it is erroneous.