DWARKA DEVI Vs. NARSINGDAS RAPRATAP SHARMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a writ, petition preferred by the landlord challenging the order of the learned Appellate Dy. Collector, Nagpur, passed in review proceedings under the C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (for short the Rent Control Order). The petitioner filed an application under Clauses 13 (3) (i) (ii) and (vi) of the Rent Control Order seeking permission to give quit notice to the respondent-tenant, who has a lease of the shop block in the building belonging to the petitioner. The learned Rent Controller rejected the application of the petitioner under Clauses 13 (3) (ii) and (vi) of the Rent Control Order. As regards Clause 13 (3) (i) the learned Rent Controller stipulated time for payment of arrears of rent, failing which permisssion thereunder was deemed to be granted. The respondent has, however, paid the arrears of rent as ordered by the learned Rent Controller and, therefore, no question of permission under Clause 13 (3) (i) survived for consideration.

(2.) The petitioner filed an appeal against the order of the learned Rent Controller dismissing her application under Clauses 13 (3) (ii) and (vi) of the Rent Control Order. In appeal the learned appellate Dy. Collector, maintained the order of the learned Rent Controller under Clause 13 (3) (ii) but reversed his order under Clause 13 (3) (vi) of the Rent Control Order. The learned appellate Court held that the petitioner has proved her bona fide need under Clause 13 (3) (vi) of the Rent Control Order. He, therefore, granted her permission thereunder. The respondent-tenant preferred a review against the aforesaid order in appeal passed by the learned Additional District Magistrate, who exercised the appellate power under Clause 21 of the Rent Control Order. The successor of the learned Additional District Magistrate (for short the A. D. M.) who passed the original order in appeal, allowed the review holding that the petitioner is not entitled to permission under Clause 13 (3) (vi) of the Rent Control Order. Thus, the application of the petitioner under all the Clauses of 13 (3) of the Rent Control Order came to be dismissed in toto. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has preferred the instant writ petition in this Court.

(3.) The learned Counsel for the petitioner has at the outset urged before me that the scope of review jurisdiction under the Rent Control Order was very limited and it was not open to the reviewing authority to reappreciate the evidence on record and come to its own independent conclusion. In support of the above submission as regards the scope of the review jurisdiction, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Anant v. Shankar, 1963 Mah LJ Note 35, and also recent decision of this Court in the case of Tukaram v. Dayalnath, 1985 Mah LJ 37. The view taken by this Court in the above decisions in regard to the scope of review jurisdiction is that it is not open to the reviewing authority to come to its own conclusion only because the view taken by it is possible on the basis of the evidence on record in the case. It is however, held in the later decision by Mohta, J. that the reviewing authority can interfere not only on a question of law but also in some cases on a question of fact also. The reviewing authority could, therefore, interfere if it found that the finding of the appellate authority in its original decision was perverse and was not according to law. It has therefore, to be determined whether the order passed by the reviewing authority in the instant case is within the scope of the review jurisdiction as determined by this court in the above cases.