(1.) The petitioner as a landlord filed before the Rent Controller, Akot, an application under clause 13(3) (ii), (v) and (vi) of the C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 for permission to give notice to the respondent No. 1 determining his lease, i.e. on the grounds of habitual default, tenant securing an alternative accommodation and the landlord needing the house for his bona fide occupation. The Rent Controller allowed the application of the landlord on all the three grounds. In appeal, the order of the Rent Controller was reversed and the application of the landlord was rejected on all the grounds. The landlord has, therefore, filed this petition.
(2.) Along k with the application a Schedule was filed by the landlord showing the dates on which amounts were paid. In this Schedule it is not shown as to for which month the particular amount of rent was paid. This is Exhibit A in the record. The respondent No. tenant had stated that he has been paying the rent every month and thus he was not habitual defaulter. The Schedule also shows that the rents are paid almost every month except on a few occasions. The last amount of Rs. 120/- was sent by money order. The cannot be considered to be a default as the landlord was refusing to accept the amount. The Schedule which has been filed by the landlord itself shows that the respondent No. 1 tenant was not in the habit of not paying the rent regularly every month. From this Schedule it cannot be gathered for what particular month the particular rent is being paid. It, however, appears that at a later stage and much after the written statement was filed by that respondent No. 1 the petitioner filed another Schedule, which is Exhibit A-2 showing the e months for which the particular rent was paid. This Schedule was filed on 3-5-1970 when the case had already been posted for evidence and adjourned from time to time. There was, therefore, no opportunity for the respondetn No. 1 to meet this Schedule Exh. A-2. The appellate Court has found that on the basis of these payment which have been made by the tenant he could not be termed to be a habitual defaulter. I do not see any illegally in the view taken by the appellate authority on the facts founding this case. The appellate authority, therefore, was not in error insetting aside the order of the Rent Controller and rejecting the application of the landlord on that count.
(3.) As regards the ground under clause 13 (3) (v) of the Rent Control Order, it is urged that the tenant has got two houses in the town and, therefore, he must be taken to have secured alternative accommodation within the meaning of clauses 13(3) (v) and, therefore the landlord was entitled to permission . It has not been brought out as to when the houses were let out by the tenant. Securing an alternative accommodation gives a cause of action to the landlord to claim permission to give notice. Evidently, therefore it must mean that after the tenancy in question was created, another accommodation must have become available to the tenant which he can occupy. For that purpose, therefore, it must be shown that on the date of the application, there was a house which was available for the tenants an alternative accommodation. No material has been placed in this case in that respect. It is not the case of the petitioner that either on the date the lease was created in favour of the respondetn No. 1 these houses owned by the respondetn No. 1 were vacant or that they became vacant any time thereafter or that they were vacant on the date of the application so that they were available of this occupation. In the absence of any such material, the petitioner landlord cannot claim permission under clause 13 (3) (v) of the Rent Control Order. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the tenant who owns his own houses, though occupied by his tenants, could make an application to evict those tenants and make that accommodation available for him. That, however, is not the scope of clause 13(3) (v). The explanation to clause 13 (3) also is not applicable because the premises owned by the respondent No. 1 are not constructed much prior to 1951. Further it is also stated that those premises are let out for business purposes and are not suitable, for residence. It cannot, therefore, be said that the tenant has secured an alternative accommodation for which permission could be greated against him. In this respect also, the order of the appellate authority was quite legal and justified.