FRAMROZE MANECKJI BILIMORIA Vs. SUHRID GEIGY TRADING LTD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The original plaintiff -trustees are the petitioners here. They are the trustees appointed under the deed of settlement dated December 23, 1953 executed by Manekji Rustomji Bilimoria and his wife Meherbai Manekji Bilimoria. The subject -matter of the suit is one of the trust properties known as 'Battery House' situate at Warden Road, Bombay. We are here concerned only with flat No. 1 on the third floor of Battery House which was leased out originally to the respondents here in 1954. There was subsequently renewal of the lease for a further period of five years. The respondents after the expiry of renewed lease continued to remain in possession and to pay rent but the petitioners terminated the tenancy of the respondents by a notice to quit in December 1964 and later filed a suit for eviction in May 1965.

(2.) THE possession was sought by the petitioners on the ground of bona fide and reasonable requirement by petitioner No. 1, who is one of the trustees and a son of late Manekji Bilimoria. The suit was resisted challenging the validity of the notice, disputing the bona fides and reasonableness of the requirement and pleading greater hardship. It wasi also contended that the petitioners were not entitled to claim possession of the suit flat on the ground of bona fide and reasonable requirement as petitioner No. 1 was not the person for whose benefit the premises were held. The trial Court held that the notice to quit was valid, that the suit premises were reasonably and bona fide required for occupation by petitioner No. 1, that there would be no greater hardship to the respondents if the decree was passed in favour of the petitioners and that petitioner No. 1 had also a right to occupy the suit premises. The trial Court, therefore, decreed the suit but that decree was challenged and the appeal was heard by the appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court, Bombay. The appellate Bench agreed with all the findings of the trial Court except on the finding that petitioner No. 1 was entitled to occupy the suit premises. The appellate Bench was of the view that petitioner No. 1 who was a trustee did not have a right to occupy the premises in his capacity as a trustee because if he wants to occupy the premises as a tenant, it would amount to substitution of one tenant by another and that the same would not be the requirement of the person for whose benefit the premises were held by the trustees. In that view of the matter the appellate Bench allowed the appeal, set aside the decree of the trial Court and dismissed the petitioners' suit. That order passed by the appellate Bench, therefore is now challenged here.

(3.) ON the basis of the above declaration by the settlors Mr. Mistree says, that the ease of petitioner No. 1 should be treated as that of a landlord with a beneficial interest as per the declaration in the trust deed. Mr. Mistree also says that the corpus was granted to each of the sons and that each one can dispose it of according to his own desire; he can even revoke the trust. In other words according to Mr. Mistree petitioner No. 1 though a trustee should be treated as a landlord with a beneficial interest. In fact according to him under Clause (6) he has a right even without rent to occupy the suit premises in the trust building. on the other hand Mr. Khambatta, the learned Counsel for the respondents contends here that Section 13(1)(g) of the Rent Act does not permit a trustee to occupy the premises by himself unless he has a right to occupy the premises. But Mr. Mistree says that the case of the petitioners would be as good as a case of a landlord requiring the premises for occupation by himself as laid down in Section 13(1)(g). On the other hand, Mr. Khambatta says that the case of the petitioners cannot come under Section 13(1)(g) but would be of a person for whose benefit the premises are held. He further says that even such a person must have a right to occupy the suit premises and unless and until he has a right it will not be possible for such a person to occupy the premises. I am inclined to agree with Mr. Khambatta for the obvious reason that the Kent Act is the Act which consolidated laws relating to control of rent and for repairs of certain premises and also of eviction. It is more or less an Act to protect the interest of the tenants who, the Legislature thought, should not in normal course be driven away and whose places should not be allowed to be substituted by other tenants.