KARAMSEY KANJI Vs. VELJI VIRJI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A very interesting and important question arises on this revision application, and I have received considerable assistance from the able arguments both of Mr. Kapadia and of Mr. Sakhardande. The facts briefly are that the landlord constructed a building in December 1946 and he let out a room on the 2nd floor of that building immediately thereafter at a rent of Rs. 28. In March 1949 the tenant applied to the learned Civil Judge at Thana for fixation of standard rent. The learned Judge dismissed that application holding that Us. 28 was the proper rent. There was an appeal to the District Court, and the learned District Judge on April 17, 1951, held that the standard rent was Rs. 23 -12 -0. The landlord then filed a suit in the Small Causes Court for arrears of rent against the tenant and the arrears claimed were from January 1, 1951, to December 81, 1951. The landlord's .contention was that he was entitled to the contractual rent of Rs. 28 for the months of January, February and March 1951 and that it was only from the date of the fixation of the standard rent, viz. April 17, 1951, that the tenant was entitled to the reduction of rent. The trial Court held in favour of the landlord, but the appellate Court came to the conclusion that the order of fixation of the standard rent was retrospective in character and therefore the landlord was not entitled to recover rent in excess of the standard rent fixed even for the period December 1950 to March 1951, and the question that has been raised in this application is as to what is the effect of the fixation of standard rent in the case of premises which were let after September 1, 1940.

(2.) TURNING to the statute, 'standard rent' is defined in Section 5(10)(b). The basic date fixed by that sub -section is September 1, 1940, and if the premises were let on September 1, 1940, then the standard rent is the rent at which they were so let; if they were not let on September 1, 1940, then the standard rent is at which they were last let before that date; and then we come to Clause (iii) where they were first let after September 1, 1940, the rent at which they were first let; and the contention is that inasmuch as these premises were first let in December 1946, they fell within this sub -section and the standard rent of these premises was Rs. 28 at which they were let. Now, there is Clause (iv) to Section 5(10)(b) which provides, 'in any of the cases specified in Section 11, the rent fixed by the Court'; and when we turn to p. 11 it provides;

(3.) RELIANCE is also placed on a judgment of the English Court in Clift v. Taylor [1948] 2 K.B. 394 Lord Justice Scot in construing the English Rent Act pointed out:.the Act interferes with freedom of contract and thus modifies an important right of the individual. Any real ambiguity of language in any particular provision, still apparent even when construed in the light of the whole Act, ought to be resolved in favour of maintaining common law rights. With respect, it is perfectly correct that a Court must lean in favour of maintaining the sanctity of contracts. But it is equally true that in construing any statute the Court must keep in mind the object which the Legislature had in placing a particular piece of legislation on the statute book, and this is even more so where the Court is dealing with a piece of social legislation. Even the learned Chief Justice in the observation on which reliance is placed says that there must be an ambiguity which is apparent after the provision is construed in the light of the whole Act, and Mr. Kapadia may be right that if after I have looked at all the provisions of the Act and borne in mind the object of the Legislature an ambiguity remains, the ambiguity should not be resolved to defeat the sanctity of contracts but to maintain that sanctity. But as I shall presently point out, in my opinion there does not seem to be any such ambiguity which would induce me to give the benefit of it to the landlord.