MAGANLAL BHAGWANDAS Vs. AHMEDABAD MUNICIPALITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE appellant in this case was the plaintiff in the trial Court, and he brought a suit against the defendant-respondent, the Municipal Borough of Ahmedabad, to recover Rs. 347 which he had paid by way of terminal tax and to obtain an injunction restraining the defendant from levying any such tax on the plaintiff's goods. THE plaintiff had a brick-kiln within the Municipal limits of Ahmedabad in a survey number which abuts on the limits of the Municipal area. As there is no direct access from this survey number to the Naroda Road he had to carry the bricks manufactured by him in his survey number to some distance outside the Municipal limits in order to join the Naroda Road in the process of taking the bricks from the factory to his place of business. When the bricks were being brought into the Municipal limits after having been taken out of those limits, the Municipal servants at the municipal toll naka levied a tax of Rs. 347 on those bricks. THE plaintiff, thereupon, filed the suit on September 21, 1939, to obtain a refund of the amount and for a perpetual injunction restraining the Municipality from collecting the terminal tax from him in future. THE contention of the defendant Municipality was that the plaintiff's goods were liable for the payment of the terminal tax inasmuch as they were brought within the Municipal limits from outside those limits and that it made no difference whether the goods in question were, in fact, manufactured within those limits. THE learned trial Judge was of opinion that if goods were prepared and stored within Municipal limits and if they were to be conveyed from that place within municipal limits to any other place within municipal limits, there could not be any imparting of goods, if in the act of conveying the goods it was found necessary to go for some distance outside the municipal limits for want of a direct passage from the place where the goods were stored, within Municipal limits to the Municipal road.

(2.) HE accordingly decreed the plaintiff's suit with costs except as regards the prayer for injunction. Against that order the defendant Municipality filed an appeal in the District Court of Ahmedabad. The learned Assistant Judge who heard the appeal was of opinion that the word "import" must be given its natural meaning, and the moment the goods were brought inside the Municipal limits from abroad, the goods became imported within the meaning of Rule 380 of the Ahmedabad Municipal Code. HE thought that the circumstance that the starting point as well as the point of finish fell within Municipal limits was no excuse for avoiding payment of the tax. In coming to this conclusion, the learned Judge referred to the case of In re Rahimu Bhanji (1897) I. L. R. 22 Bom. 843 and the unreported decision of Mr. Justice Broomfield in C. Prabhudas & Co. v. Ahmedabad Municipality (1934) C. R. A. No. 239 of 1934. HE, therefore, allowed the appeal, set aside the decree of the trial Court and dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs throughout. Against that order the plaintiff has filed this second appeal.

(3.) THE learned Counsel for the appellant invited our attention to a decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Emperor v. Sheikh Ajmeri (1933) I. L. R. 56 All. 241. In that case, the Municipal area consisted of two detached territories, and according to the Municipalities Act, octroi was payable in respect of goods and animals introduced within the octroi limits or brought within the Municipal limits. A question arose whether the animals brought from one detached area of the Municipal limits into the other Municipal area were subject to the payment of the octroi. THE learned Judges held that in their opinion the significance of the words "introducing" and "brought in" was that they must be imported from outside the Municipal limits altogether, and that they were not meant to cover a case of transit where the goods were transferred from one part of the Municipality to another part within its limits. THE learned Judges were not there interpreting the word "import" as we have to in the present case and were, no doubt, influenced very largely by the fact that the Municipal limits in that case also included a detached area of Jharnanala separated by a distance of three miles from the old Municipal limits of Agra. In that case, it was physically impossible for a person within one part of the Municipal area to go into the other part of the Municipal area without going outside that area for a distance of three miles. THE practical difficulties in the way of adopting any other construction were so great that the learned Judges thought that the words "introducing" and "brought in" were not intended to cover a case of transit from one part of the Municipality to another part within its limits. Even so, the learned Judges realized that the interpretation they were putting on those words was bound to create practical difficulties. At page 246 they observe: THE Municipal Board would not know wherefrom the animals were being imported and they are entitled to demand octroi duty as soon as they enter the municipal limits of Jharnanala. But if the accused were to establish that these animals were within the municipal limits of Agra and the identical animals have been brought from there into the limits of Jharnanala, then no octroi duty would be leviable, because in our opinion this would not be a case of importing goods or animals from outside the municipal limits.