MOHANDAS MULJI SICKA Vs. COLLECTOR OF BOMBAY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a rule nisi for a writ of certiorari and subsidiary reliefs which has been obtained by Mr. Mohandas Mulji Sicka, against the Collector of Bombay. The circumstances are briefly these:

(2.) MR. Sicka is the owner of a house called "Sicka Villa" in Pedder Road in this city and used hmiself to reside till December, 1942, in Calcutta. In that month he was minded to go and live in his own house in Bombay. He has, apparently, a large family and is a man of very good position in life, and, quite naturally, required considerable premises for his occupation. At the time his house was let to three persons, one occupying each of its three floors-one MR. Coutino lived on the ground floor, one MRs. Fatah on the first floor, and a MR. Potter on the top floor. With a view to getting rid of these people and occupying the whole house himself MR. Sicka gave the tenants notice. Pursuant to such notice MR. Potter, obligingly, went out. MRs. Fatah apparently still holds her portion of the premises under a contractual tenancy and consequently would not go, while MR. Coutino on the ground floor continued to occupy the premises claiming the benefit of the Rent Restriction Order. The result is that at the moment the top floor is occupied by the applicant,-and it seems that the top floor is wholly inadequate for the requirements of hie family,- the middle flat is occupied by a sitting contractual tenant and the ground floor is occupied by a statutory tenant.

(3.) THE general principles of law applicable to the case are not in dispute. THEy are well settled by such cases as Local Government Board v. Alridge [1915] A. C. 120, and they may be briefly stated : where a non-judicial body or person is saddled by the Legislature with quasi-judicial duties it or he must, first of all, follow the procedure, if any, which the Legislature has prescribed for it or him, and if and in so far as no such procedure is prescribed it or he must act "in accordance with natural justice"; that is only to say that it or he must hear the parties, or, at all events, the party against whom it or he is giving a decision fairly and must decide the matter itself or himself after due consideration. It must not, for example, give a decision which is the result of the arbitrament of chance. In this particular case Mr. Setalvad in his able argument contends that the Legislature by providing that the Collector shall "decide the appeal" has impliedly prescribed the course he is to follow, viz. to hear the appellant; though all it has expressly said he must do is to examine the record.