VINAYAK PANDURANGRAO Vs. SHESHADASACHARYA RAMACHARYA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a revision application against an order made by the First Class Subordinate Judge of Bijapur under Section 37 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors' Relief Act, XXVIII of 1939. The applicant obtained a decree against the opponent in Small Cause; Suit No. 1531 of 1932 on March 24, 1933, and filed darkhast No. 478 of 1936 to execute the decree, and a land belonging to the opponent was attached. The proceedings were transferred to the Collector for sale of the property. Five days before the date fixed for the sale, the opponent made an application under the Bom bay Agricultural Debtors' Relief Act that the execution proceedings should be stayed.

(2.) TO that application the applicant put in his objections. These were heard on July 20,. 1942, and the case was adjourned to August 10, 1942, for passing orders. On August 10 and 13, 1942, the opponent put in affidavits of two persons on hi s behalf to show that his father Ramacharya, the original debtor, had been personally cultivating his fields. The applicant contended that the allegations made in the affidavits were false and asked that he should be given an opportunity to cross-examine the deponents and to produce certain documents to rebut the affidavits. The documents which he produced were extracts from the Record of Rights showing that seven different lands be longing to Ramacharya had been let out to tenants in the years 1929-30 and 1930-31. The learned Judge admitted the documents but made no orders as to the prayer for cross-examining the deponents, and on the same day he made an order holding that the opponent was a debtor as defined in the Bombay Agricultural Debtors' Relief Act and that his debts did not amount to more than Rs. 15,000. He directed that the proceedings should be transferred to the Debt Adjustment Board at Indi for deci sion according to law. Against that order the applicant has come in revision on the ground that there was no satisfactory evidence to show that the opponent's father had been personally cultivating lands, that the Judge should not have allowed the opponent to put in affidavits without the knowledge of the applicant and after the hearing of the case had been concluded, and that his doing so amounted to a material irregularity.

(3.) THERE is also another ground on which in our opinion Section 73 doesi not come in the way of the applicant. That section prevents any civil Court from entertaining any suit or proceeding in respect of matters pending before the Board or the Court under the Act, or in respect to the validity of any procedure or the legality of any award, order or decision of the Board or of the Court. The word, proceeding; in this section must be interpreted as ejusdem generis with the word " suit" which precedes it, and it seems to us to be intended to refer to suits or proceedings of an original nature in the subordinate Courts. The object of the section evidently was to provide that Subordinate Judges' Courts should not take cognizance of or proceed with matters which were already being dealt with by the Boards or the special Courts created by the Act. In Kirpa Singh v. Ajaipal Singh (1928) I. L. R. 10 Lah. 165, F. B. a full bench of the Lahore High Court observed that the words " suits" and " proceedings " have) different meanings in different statutes, that it is not possible to lay down a general rule which would be applicable to all cases, and that in each particular case the question must be examined in reference to the context and that meaning preferred which will best fit in with! it. Accordingly they held that in Sections 29 and 30 of the Gurdwara. Act these words must be construed as signifying actions in the trial Court or proceedings ejusdem generis and cannot be held to include appeals. Examined in the light of these remarks the words " suit or proceeding " in Section 73 seem to us to apply only to suits or proceedings of an original nature and not to include revision applications filed in this Court.