(1.) HEARD A.F. Diniz, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant and Shri Padiyar, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent. The above Appeal came to be admitted by Order dated 05.10.2011 on the following substantial questions of law:
(2.) SHRI A.F. Diniz, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant, has pointed out that the learned Trial Judge had in fact decreed the suit filed by the Appellant, inter alia, granting a declaration to the effect that the Resolution revoking the house tax number by Order dated 03.04.2001 was not tenable and directed the Respondent to allot a fresh house number. Learned Counsel has pointed out that in the impugned Order dated 03.04.2001, there is a reference to the effect that there was a Resolution passed by the Council to revoke such house tax number. Learned Counsel further pointed out that no such Resolution was produced and, as such, the said Order stands vitiated. Learned Counsel has thereafter taken me through the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court and pointed out that the learned Judge has essentially considered a reference to a Resolution dated 17.04.2000 to come to the conclusion that the Resolution was in fact known to the Appellant. Learned Counsel has further pointed out that the show -cause notice was dated 10.05.2000 and the reply was sent on 31.05.2000 and, as such, the reference to the Resolution in the impugned Order cannot be referable to the said Resolution dated 17.04.2000. Learned Counsel further pointed out that the Lower Appellate Court has misconstrued the material on record to reject the contention of the Appellant that the Respondents have failed to establish that there was any such Resolution to the effect that the house tax number is to be revoked. Learned Counsel further pointed out that the records also reveal that though reply was filed by the Appellant on 31.05.2000, nevertheless, the allegations made in the reply have not at all been considered by the Respondent whilst passing the impugned Order dated 03 -04 -2000. Learned Counsel as such pointed out that there is a breach of the principles of natural justice in not considering the said reply whilst passing the impugned Order. Learned Counsel further pointed out that as the Resolution has not been produced and the defence of the Appellant was not considered whilst passing the impugned Order would by itself vitiates the said Order of revocation which requires to be quashed and set aside. Learned Counsel further submitted that he would not press for the second substantial question of law framed by this Court.
(3.) I have considered the submissions of the learned Counsel. I have also gone through the record. The main contention of the Appellant is that there was no Resolution which preceded the impugned Order dated 03.04.2000. On perusal of the said Order, no doubt, there is a reference to the effect that such Resolution was passed by the Municipal Council but, however, no such Resolution was produced though there was a specific grievance raised by the Appellant to that effect. Be that as it may, Shri A.F. Diniz, learned Counsel, in any event, was unable to point out any specific provisions in law which requires that such Resolution should precede the revocation of the house tax number. In such circumstances, merely because no such Resolution was produced by itself, would not mean that the impugned order of revocation passed by the Municipal Council on 03.04.2001 stands vitiated. But, however, on perusal of the records, Shri A.F. Diniz, learned Counsel, has vehemently raised a contention that the principles of natural justice were breached by the Respondents whilst passing the impugned Order dated 03.04.2001.