STATE OF MAHARASHTRA Vs. BHIKULAL MAHADEO AGRAWAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The State of Maharashtra had filed these three Second Appeals against the respective respondents, who are the heirs of original plaintiff ' late Shri Bhikulal Mahadeo Agrawal being aggrieved by the common Judgment and Decree dated 2nd May, 1997 passed by learned Second Additional District Judge, Buldana, in Regular Civil Appeal Nos. 105, 126 and 127 all of 1990, arising out the common Judgment and Decree dated 17th August, 1990 passed by learned Second Joint Civil Judge [Senior Division], Buldana, in Regular Civil Suit Nos. 134 and 135 both of 1987, so also the order allowing the Cross-Objection filed by the Plaintiff in Regular Civil Appeal No. 127 of 1990.

(2.) In support of the Second Appeals, learned Asstt. Govt. Pleader for the appellant-State vehemently argued that the suits filed by the respondent-original plaintiff in all these cases were barred in the light of Section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876. The learned Asstt. Govt. Pleader further contended that the Civil Court did not have the power to give a direction to the Govt. to grant fresh leases or permanent leases of lands after expiry of the original periods of leases by efflux of time and, therefore, the suits ought to have been dismissed.

(3.) Per contra, learned Adv. Mr. Mehadia for the respondents in all these appeals supported the impugned Judgments and Decree. He argued that the subject-matter of the suits does not at all fall within the parameters of Section 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876, and at any rate, the said issue about the jurisdiction was not raised by the Appellant-State. In the alternative, he argued that the respondent-plaintiff had applied for renewal of lease of land which was in his possession and also for grant of permanent lease, as was done in the cases of other land holders and, therefore, there was a hostile discrimination by adopting a different yardstick by the appellant- State, in which case the Civil Court was also entitled to make the order directing issuance of temporary or permanent leases. He, therefore, contended that at any rate, it was obligatory on the part of the Collector of the district to decide the applications which were admittedly pending and having failed to do so, even now a direction can be issued to the Collector of the district to decide those applications in accordance with law.