ASHOK BABURAO INGAVALE Vs. PRALHAD HARI BHATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India takes exception to the judgment and order dated April 16, 1981, passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Pune, in Revision no. MRT MS-X@4/81 (TNC. 8. 371/81) Pane. The land in question admeasures 7 acres 15 gunthas bearing Gut No. 606, situated at village kidgaon, taluka and District Satara. The land was originally owned by father of respondent No. 1. The petitioners' predecessor was the tenant in the suit land prior to the tillers day; On account of that, he became the deemed purchaser by operation of law. The tenant paid the purchase price, consequent to which certificate under section 32-M of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act was issued in his favour on 28-11-1971. Thereafter, the tenant entered into sale deed in respect of 55 per cent share in the suit land in favour of Shaikh Akbar Ibrahim on 3rd January, 1972 for consideration. He also entered into a lease deed in respect of remaining 45 per cent share in the suit land by lease deed dated 7th February, 1976. It is not in dispute that the alleged transactions entered into by the tenant in respect of the suit land for transfer of the suit land were without obtaining prior permission of the Collector, as was required by section 43 of the Act. This complaint was received in the office of the tahsildar, who initiated suo motu proceedings for resumption of the suit land. The Tahsildar, after giving opportunity to the concerned parties, by judgment and order dated November 30, 1979, declared that the sale deed entered into by the tenant to the extent of 55 per cent share in the suit land as well as the lease created to the extent of 45 per cent share in the suit land were invalid, because prior permission of the Collector under section 43 was not obtained. The Tahsildar by the said order further declared that the suit land shall be deemed to vest in the State Government free from all the encumbrances lawfully subsisting on the date of such vesting and shall be disposed of as per section 32-P of the Act. Against this decision, the lessor Mr. Anandrao Pandurang Dhombre, the purchaser mr. Shaikh Akbar Ibrahim, the tenant Mr. Ashok Baburao Ingavale and five others, petitioners herein, preferred separate appeals before the Sub-Divisional Officer. The said appeals were allowed by the Appellate Authority on the reasoning that the evidence was not sufficient to establish the transaction between the parties. Against this decision, the original owner, respondent No. 1 herein, preferred revision application before the maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The said revision application was resisted by the respondents herein, inter alia, on the ground that the respondent no. 1 had no locus standi to maintain the revision, as he was neither party to the original proceedings nor the proceedings before the appellate Authority, and cannot be said to be interested person, so as to maintain revision application. Even on merits, the respondents supported the view taken by the Appellate Authority in allowing the appeals and remanding the case for further enquiry to the first authority. The Tribunal, however, by judgment and order confirmed the view taken by the first authority and opined that in view of the materials on record, there was no question of remanding the matter to the first authority for further enquiry. Insofar as the objection regarding locus of the respondent No. 1 to maintain the revision application is concerned, even that contention did not find favour with the Tribunal. Accordingly, the revision preferred by the respondent no. 1 was allowed and the order passed by the first authority (Tahsildar)came to be restored. Against this decision, the present writ petition has been filed by the tenants. It is not in dispute that the subsequent purchaser Shaikh Akbar Ibrahim as well as the lessor Anandrao Pandurang dhombre have not questioned the correctness of the decision of the Tribunal before this Court by independent writ petition.

(2.) THE first argument canvassed on behalf of the petitioners herein is that the respondent No. 1 had no locus standi to maintain the revision application before the Tribunal. It is next contended that the view taken by the Appellate Authority was correct, in that there was no legal evidence to establish the factum of transfer in favour of the lessor or the subsequent purchaser. It is, therefore, submitted that the Tribunal has completely exceeded its jurisdiction to record a finding of fact, which is contrary to the materials on record. It is lastly contended that the petitioners' tenant was a disabled person and for which reason it was imperative for the tenant to give away a portion of the land on lease and portion by way of sale in favour of the respective parties; and in such a case, the rigours of section 43 will have no application. To buttress this submission, reliance was placed on the definition of expression "to cultivate personally" contained in section 2 (6) of the Act.

(3.) ON the other hand, Counsel for the respondent No. 1 submits that there is no substance in the objection regarding the locus standi of the respondent No. 1. He submits that the assuming that the petitioners may be right in contending that the respondent No. 1 could not have maintained the revision application, the fact remains that the suo motu proceedings were initiated by the Tahsildar on receipt of complaint and if it is so, it was open to the respondent No. 1 to maintain revision application, because the respondent No. 1 was the erstwhile owner of the suit land and can be said to be interested person. It is next contended that no fault can be found with the finding recorded by the revisional authority, because that is founded on documents on record. It is submitted that the revisional authority has rightly observed that the Appellate authority proceeded to reverse the finding reached by the first authority on specious reasoning by relying upon the statement of the party, who was interested to see that the land is not resumed to the State Government. Insofar as the last contention is concerned, the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 contends that even if the tenant purchaser was a disabled person and had good reason to part with the possession of the suit land or transfer the suit land to third party, he was obliged to obtain prior permission of the Collector as was required under section 43 of the Act, in absence of which the transaction will have to be treated as invalid by virtue of sub-section (2) of section 43 of the Act.