CANARA BANK STAFF UNION Vs. CANARA BANK

JUDGEMENT

(1.) HEARD Mr. Singh for the petitioners and mr. Rele for the Respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 2 has been served. However, none appears for Respondent No. 2. It is agreed that Respondent No. 2 is a formal party. In the circumstances, matter is taken up for final disposal with the consent of counsel appearing for the contesting parties. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith, by consent. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 waives notice.

(2.) THIS Writ Petition takes exception to the Judgment and Order passed by the authority under Section 33-C (l) of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Regional labour Commissioner (C) Mumbai, dated september 4, 2003 in proceedings/application no. Ml6 (1)/2000-CON. It is not necessary to burden this Judgment with all the events that have led to the filing of this petition. Suffice it to observe that the respondent No. 2 Authority has rejected the application preferred by the petitioners under Section 33-C (l) of the Act only on the ground that the Award pressed into service on behalf of the Petitioners does not finally determine the due amount and also because the Management was disputing the amount as calculated by the petitioners. This is the only reason which made the respondent No. 2 to reject the application under Section 33-C (l) of the Act filed by the Petitioners, as according to him no adjudication can be made in the nature of the present proceedings to arrive at the amount which is due and payable to the petitioners.

(3.) MR. Singh appearing for the petitioners has relied on the decisions of the Supreme court in case of Kays Construction Company (Pvt.) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. AIR 1965 SC 1488 : 1965-II-LLJ-429. In case of Sawatram Ramprasad Mills Company limited v. Baliram Ukandaji and Anr. AIR 1966 sc 616 : 1966-I-LLJ-41 as well as Fabrit gasosa v. Labour Commissioner and Others air 1997 SC 954 : 1997 (3) SCC 150 : 1997-I-LLJ-872. According to the learned counsel for petitioners these decisions were produced before the Authority below, but are not even adverted to in the impugned decision. It is contended that from the aforesaid decisions it is well settled that the Authority is obliged to determine the amount even in an application under Section 33-C (l) of the Act. Learned counsel contends that from the findings as can be culled out from the award between the parties the factual position was not in dispute and the Authority could have determined the amount on the basis of the said admitted and established facts. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 contends that no fault can be found with the view taken by the respondent No. 2 while rejecting the application as filed by the petitioners because the Award does not finally determine the amount due and payable to the petitioners and also because the Management was disputing the calculations submitted on behalf of the petitioners. He further submits that the management was disputing the calculations submitted on behalf of the petitioners for more than one reason, including that the workmen did not work for the number of days as claimed by them and if that is the nature of dispute, the same cannot be adjudicated by the Authority while considering application under Section 33-C (l)of the Act.