(1.) This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India takes exception to the judgment and order dated 3rd February 1984 passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, kolhapur, in revision No. MRT-KP-24/1981. Briefly stated, the land in question is Survey No. 65 admeasuring 15 acres 18 gunthas situated at village Sule, taluka ajara, district Kolhapur. The Petitioners claim to be tenants in respect of the suit land. The respondents are the landlords of the suit land. This matter has chequered history. Suffice it to mention that earlier round of litigation culminated with the order passed by this Court in special Civil Application No. 586 of 1965 decided on June 14, 1967. The order reads thus :
(2.) According to Mr. Hombalkar, for the petitioned, since all earlier orders passed by the tenancy authorities between the parties were set aside by consent as is noted in the decision of this Court in the earlier round, it presupposes that the Respondents landlords conceded the relationship between the parties to be one of landlord and tenant and the question of tenancy was no more open to be examined by any authority. He further submits that the record would indicate that the Petitioners were in lawful possession of the suit land on 1st April 1957 and in that view of the matter, the petitioners became deemed purchasers by operation of law and, as a consequence of that, the process of determination of purchase price was inevitable. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court reported in A. I. R. 1983 S. C. 643 in the case of Amrit Bhikaji Kale v. Kashinath Janardhan Trade to buttress the above submission.
(3.) On the other hand, Counsel for the respondents, Mr. Dani, contends that merely because earlier orders passed by the tenancy authorities have been set aside by consent, that does not presuppose that the Respondents accepted the relationship between the parties that of landlord and tenant. He submits that in any case it is the Petitioners who themselves took out formal application, which is a substantive proceedings, under the provisions of section 70 (b) of the Act for declaration that they were tenants. It is not open to the Petitioners now to contend that the said issue could not have been examined by the tenancy authorities. He further submits that the Petitioners questioned the decision rendered against them by the tenancy authorities right upto the revisional Court and that decision has become final. If it is so, it is too late in the day for the Petitioners to contend that the issue of tenancy was no longer open for examination of any authority. He further submits that as the issue of tenancy has been answered against. the Petitioners by competent Court, that decision will be binding on the parties having attained finality. In his submissions therefore, the status of the petitioners is not of tenants in occupation on the Tillers Day, for which reason the question of determination of purchase price under section 32-S of the Act does not arise. he submits that reliance placed on the decision of the Apex court, referred to above, by the Petitioners is wholly misplaced and inapposite to the fact situation of the present case.