RANJIT SHRIPATRAO HOLKAR Vs. ANANDA SAKHARAM BHILARE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS petition, filed under Article 227 of the constitution of India by the owners of an agricultural land in village Bhilare, Taluka Mahabaleshwar, Dist. Satara, questions the correctness of Judgment and order passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Pune in revision Application No. MRT. N. S. 11/6/83 (Ten. B. 45/83)dated February 18, 1987. The proceedings have emanated from an application preferred by the landlord for possession of the suit lands under sections 14, 25 and 29 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The original petitioner is the successor-in-interest of the landlady malatibai Shripatrao Holkar, who was a disabled landlord being widow on 1st April, 1957, on account of which the tiller's day stood postponed. The respondents had committed default during the year 1972-73, 1973-74 and 1974 75 for which demand notices were sent by the landlady from time to time. Eventually termination notice was sent on 1st December, 1975 which was duly served upon the tenant on 3rd December, 1975. The original tenant however, died on 3rd March, 1976 and soon thereafter, the landlady expired on 9th June, 1976. The original petitioner is the successor of the deceased landlady. The Revenue Authority mutated the revenue record and the original petitioner's name was inserted in the revenue record on 6th June, 1977. The original petitioner thereafter instituted present application under section 14 r/w 25 and 29 of the Act on 16th June, 1977 for possession of the suit land on the ground of default committed by the tenant. Suffice it to mention that the application was rejected by the first authority on the ground that the same was barred by limitation. The appeal filed against the said decision by the original petitioner was allowed by the Sub Divisional officer. Against the said decision, the tenant filed revision before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Pune bench, which allowed the same taking the view that the tenant was a protected tenant and since the proceedings under section 31 of the Act was pending, two parallel proceedings cannot be permitted and the application as filed was barred by limitation. Against this decision, the original petitioner filed present writ petition in this court. This court (Shri Bobde, J) by Judgment and order dated January 10,2003 allowed the writ petition negating the reasons which had weighed with the tribunal. This court found that application was filed within limitation and also recorded a finding that no proceedings under section 31 of the Act were pending between the parties. Against this decision, the tenant/respondents carried the matter in appeal before the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 8670/2003. The said appeal has been allowed by the Judgment and Order dated november 07, 2003 and the writ petition came to be remanded. The order of the Apex Court reads as under". Leave granted. After hearing learned senior counsel for the parties on either side, we feel that this is a case which needs to be heard afresh by the High Court of Bombay on the questions regarding applicability or otherwise of sections 31 and 14 of the bombay Tenancy Act and the ralevance of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High court in Harshavardhan Shmiyas Potnis Vs. Mahadu Pundalik Gangurde (AIR 1980 Bombay l to the facts of the present case. Since the matter is pending since long, we request the High Court to take up the matter immediately and dispose it of preferably within three months' from the date of communication of this order. The status-quo order, already granted, shall continue pending disposal of the matter by the High Court, pursuant to this order. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms. No costs. "

(2.) THE limited controversy that arises for my consideration in terms of the remanded order referred to above is to examine the applicability or otherwise of sections 31 and 14 of the Act and the efficacy of the judgment of this court in Harshavardhan's case (Supra) to the facts of the present case.

(3.) MR. Sali for the respondents contends that having regard to the purport of section 32f of the Act, the only remedy for the disabled landlady or her successor in interest is to seek possession under section 31 of the Act on the ground of personal cultivation and not otherwise. It is thus contended that the ground of default is unavailable to a disabled landlord. To support this proposition, reliance is placed on the decision of our High Court, reported in 1975 (Vol. 78)BLR 427 (Division Bench) in case of Nago Dattu Hahajan vs. Smt. Yeshodabai Huna Mahajan. Besides, Mr. Sail contends that his argument is re-inforced even by the provisions of section 32h of the Act which provides for remedy of adjustment of arrears of rent towards purchase price to be paid by the tenant. Mr. Sali also contends that the remedy invoked by the landlord was in any case required to be invoked within one year from the date of death of the original landlady. These are the only submissions canvassed before me by Mr. Sali for the respondents.