WAMAN NARAYAN TRIMBAKKAR Vs. CROMPTON GREAVES LTD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BY this writ petition, the Petitioner seeks to challenge the order of the Industrial Court dismissing his complaint filed under Items 5, 6, 9 and 10 of schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act. According to the petitioner, he had been deliberately deprived of the benefits of the permanency by giving him artificial breaks in service and thereby the Respondents had committed unfair labour practices. The Petitioner was initially appointed on 2. 1. 1975 on a temporary basis with Respondent No. 1. He worked there as such till 16. 5. 1975. After a gap of 10 years, the Petitioner was provided work by the Respondents on 4. 9. 1985. He continued in service intermittently as and when work was available with the respondent for a period of almost 5 years, that is, from 4. 9. 1985 to 6. 5. 1990. It appears that on 24. 6. 1988, a settlement Mas entered into between the Union representing the workmen and the respondent no. 1 herein. Clause 13 of the settlement dealt with permanency of temporary workers. Under this clause, it was agreed that the respondent would make 60s temporary workmen permanent during the pendency of the settlement in a phased manner. However, there Mas a stipulation incorporated that those temporary workmen Mho had not reported for work or Mho had not been called for work since 1. 7. 1982 Mould not be considered for permanency. Accordingly, several workers Mere made permanent after displaying the seniority list.

(2.) THE Petitioner filed a complaint under section 28 r/'m Items 5, 6, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act alleging that the respondent had committed an unfair labour practice by not making him permanent although persons junior to him had been made permanent. The claim of the Petitioner Mas that though he had completed 240 days during the year 1988-89, the respondent had not made him permanent in service. It mas claimed in the complaint that besides there being a breach of the settlement, the respondent had violated the provisions of the standing orders applicable to the workman under which on completion of 240 days, the petitioner Mas entitled to be made permanent. The respondent by their written statement filed before the industrial Court denied the allegations in the complaint and submitted that under clause 13 of the settlement, the Petitioner was not entitled to be considered for permanency as he was not called for work prior to 1982 as stipulated in that clause. It Mas contended that the petitioner could not claim permanency when there was a break of 10 years between his initial appointment in 1975 and his appointment in 1983. Evidence was led on behalf of both the parties before the Industrial Court.

(3.) THE industrial Court on an assessment of the oral and documentary evidence on record came to the conclusion that the settlement of 24. 6. 1988 had not been breached qua the petitioner. the respondent did not accept the documents produced by the complainant at annexure A to the complaint showing the number of days worked by him. According to the Industrial Court, this document had not been proved and, therefore, it could not be accepted as evidence. Furthermore, the industrial Court held in my view rightly that the initial appointment of 1975 could not be considered for implementation of clause 13 of the settlement as there mas a continuous gap of 10 years. The Industrial Court took into consideration that the recognised union of which the Petitioner Mas a member had not agitated his case before the respondent, thereby obtaining the permanency for the Petitioner. It appears that the issue whether the Petitioner is entitled to permanency de hors the settlement as he had completed 240 days in service Mas not argued before the Industrial Court, although pleaded in the complaint. Nor has the issue as to whether by giving artificial breaks in service over the period from 1985 to 1770 amounted to unfair labour practice under Item 6 of Schedule IV been considered by the Industrial Court. The order of the Industrial Court is silent on these issues and only decides whether there mas a breach of the settlement of 1988.