S M MALLEWAR Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BY these writ petitions filed under Art. 326 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have impugned the statutory notification dated the 14th of September, 1992, bearing No. BPA-1088/ 1866/exc-3, issued by the Government of Maharashtra under S. 139 (1) (a) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, declaring the area of Gadchiroli district of the State "as a dry district" by enforcing "prohibition" throughout the district with effect from 2nd day of October, 1992 and follow-up and consequential orders issued by the Collector of Gadchiroli on 15/09/1992 directing cancellation of subsisting licences expiring on 31/03/1993 with effect from expiry of 15 days from the date of the impugned orders. Prior to issue of the impugned notification and the said orders, the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 2116 of 1992 were holding licences to sell country-liquor in Form Cl-III for the retail sale of country-liquor for the period 1/04/1992 till 31/03/1993. The basic facts and the basic issues concerning the entire group of writ petitions are almost identical. All the writ petitions forming part of this group of writ petitions are heard together.

(2.) BY the said notification, dated 14th September, 1992, the Government of Maharashtra declared the area of Gadchiroli district of the State as a dry district, with effect from the 2nd day of October, 1992. By the said notification, it was declared that the Government of Maharashtra had decided to do so in the interest of general public in that district and, particularly, as the area of Gadchiroli district of the State consisted "mainly of the tribal area". The Gadchiroli district has about 40% of population of tribals in most of the areas and about 51% of such population in some of the areas and is one of the backward districts of the State. As a necessary consequence of said declaration, the Government of Maharashtra prohibited the grant of licences and permits specified in the Schedule thereto in the Gadchiroli district of the State with effect from 2nd day of October, 1992. It is well known that 2nd October is birthday of father of the nation and has special solemnity for people of India. As a necessary corollary of the said order, it was i further declared by the said notification that any such licences and permits, which were already granted by the Collector of the district before the 2nd day of October, 1992 and which were in force shall stand cancelled with effect from the 2nd day of October, 1992 on taking of action towards cancellation of such licences and permits by the statutory authority granting such licences and permits in accordance with the provisions of Cl. (a) of Sub-Section (1) of S. 56 of the said Act. The Schedule to the said notification sets out the list of various licences and permits which were directed to be cancelled as an essential measure of follow-up action in order to effectuate the enforcement of prohibition policy in the said district. On 15/09/1992, the Collector of Gadchiroli issued necessary orders to the effect that the subsisting licences shall stand cancelled on expiry of 15 days from the date of the said orders. The Collector of Gadchiroli did so in consequence of statutory notification dated 14/09/1992 referred to hereinabove in exercise of powers conferred on him under S. 56 (1) (a), of the Act.

(3.) I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners at some length. I have also heard the learned counsel for the respondents and Shri K. H. Deshpande, Senior Advocate, as an Amicus Curiae. The petitioners have impugned the constitutional validity of S. 139 (1) (a) and S. 56 of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949. The petitioners have also impugned the validity of notification dated 14/09/1992 and the follow-up orders dated 15/09/1992 cancelling the licences of the various licence-holders issued on 15/09/1992 on various grounds. The challenge to orders of cancellation of licences has become more or less academic as the petitioners have been able to operate upon the licences and permits by reason of stay order granted by this Court at the stage of admission of writ petitions and the said licences and permits would have expired on 31/03/1993. The learned counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 2210 of 1992, as well as the learned counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 2249 of 1992, have urged certain additional contentions. I shall deal with all these contentions in the later part of this order. Daru Mukti Sanghatna, an organisation, has filed an application for being impleaded as party-respondent in these petitions. In the alternative, the said organisation has sought permission to intervene. The said application is opposed. I have decided to permit Shri K. H. Deshpande and learned Advocates on record for intervenors to assist the Court at the hearing of the petitions as the Court has ample discretion to hear any Counsel at the hearing as the Court deems fit. Shri K. H, Deshpande, Senior Advocate, shall have the status of an Amicus Curiae in these writ petitions. In this view of the matter, I have decided that no formal order need be passed on the application for joining of the organisation as party-respondent, or for intervention. The learned counsel for the petitioners have made valiant effort to convince the Court that the petitions deserve to be allowed. The learned counsel for respondents have assisted the Court with their equally well prepared submissions and thorough preparation. Right at the outset, I must observe that I have remained unconvinced with the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners, in view of my conclusion that almost all the points urged on behalf of the petitioners are covered by judgments of the Apex Court against the petitioners. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the prohibition laws and the statutory orders or rules made thereunder. This case will require brief survey of leading judgments of the Supreme Court cited by the learned counsel on either side. However, it is not considered necessary to refer to each of the judgments cited by the learned counsel on either side during course of their respective submissions.