VIMLA DEVI G MAHESHWARI Vs. S K LAUL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner has challenged an order dated 18-2-1993 being a de novo order under section 269-UD of the income-tax Act, 1961 under which, for reasons recorded in that order, respondents 1 and 2 exercised their power to purchase the petitioners property being Flat No. 1, on the first floor of Avanti Building, Off Netaji Subhash Road, Bombay---400 002.

(2.) THE petitioner entered into an agreement dated 1st of August 1987 with the 3rd respondent under which the petitioner had agreed to sell the above flat to the 3rd respondent for a sum of Rs. 23 lakhs. This was the subject-matter of an earlier order of purchase under section 269ud dated 23-9-1987. This order was challenged in Writ Petition No. 3290 of 1987. The petitioner was admitted and a stay of the order of 23-9-1987 was granted in terms of the Minutes dated 7-10-1987. The writ petition was disposed of by this Court by their order dated 18-12-1992 in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (C. B. Gautam v. Union of India) reported in 199 I. T. R. 530. The High Court directed the Appropriate Authority to comply with the directions of the Supreme Court relating to granting a hearing to the petitioner before passing an order under section 269ud and giving reasons for the order. Accordingly, the matter was remanded to the appropriate Authority. The petitioner received a show cause notice dated 18th of January 1993 asking the petitioner to show cause why an order should not be made under section 269-UD (1 ). Respondents 1 and 2 also furnished to the petitioner the reasons which were recorded while passing the earlier order of 23-9-1987. Thereafter a hearing was given to the petitioner and the present impugned order, giving reasons, has been passed on 18-2-1993.

(3.) THE present petition challenges the second order of 18th February 1993. The petitioner contends that this order deserves to be set aside because it discloses non-application of mind and also because it is an erroneous order. It is contended by Dr. Dastur, who appears on behalf of the petitioner, that the instances of sale which are relied upon by the department are not comparable instances and also because the two instances which were cited by the petitioner have been ignored in the order. We find from the order that the Appropriate Authority has in its order critically examined the three instances which were relied upon by the department. The Appropriate Authority has noted the location of these flats as also the purchase price which was paid for these flats, although they were sold much earlier. The Appropriate Authority has also dealt with the two instances which were relied upon by the petitioner. It has held that even in respect of the instance of a sale of flat in Thakur Niwas, which is relied upon by the petitioner, the rate is Rs. 2,075/- per sq. ft. as against the rate of Rs. 1,735/- per sq. ft. in the case of the petitioner. The Authority has further observed that in respect of the sale of a flat in the Rajhana Building, (the second instance relied upon by the petitioner), the petitioner has not given any particulars and hence this instance is of no assistance. The petitioner contends that the sale of this flat in Rajhans Building was approved by respondents 1 and 2 and hence they ought to have the particulars of this sale with them. In our view, when the petitioner was relying upon any sale instance, the petitioner should have furnished some particulars of that sale. We have to remember that the hearing which the Supreme Court has directed to be given is a hearing in a limited time frame looking to the scheme of Chapter XXC. Hence any elaborate inquiry extending over a long period of time is not contemplated; nor any detailed adducing of evidence which may take a considerable length of time. The Supreme Court itself has observed in the above case that looking to the time frame within which the order has to be passed, what is possible is a limited or summary inquiry, the whole purpose being to enable the petitioner to put forth his case before the department as to why a purchase order should not be made. The hearing opportunity for example, would enable the petitioner to point out why the price was appropriate. He can also point out any special circumstances in which a lower price has been agreed upon. It was therefore, for the petitioner to adduce appropriate material in support of his contention. He cannot contend that the department should search its records pertaining to some other case to gather particulars for the benefit of the petitioner. We also do not find any application by the petitioner for the production of any records. The Appropriate Authority has considered the material produced by the petitioner. The grievance, therefore, of the petitioner in the present case that the comparable sale instances have not been taken into account or have not been properly considered, does not appear to be justified.