DEVIDAS SHRIDHAR REGE Vs. ARJUN DHONDU PURALKAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BOTH these writ petitions impugn an order of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, dated 12-2-1981. They raise ad issue of some interest, namely, the scope of review as contemplated by Section 326 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966. Whereas it is the general principle of law that a review would normally be permissible only in cases where something new either by way of material that goes to the root of the matter or by way of a judicial decision or provisions of law which would most certainly and substantially alter the verdict, is subsequently produced and that it would not be justified if the argument is that the Court itself was in error and has committed a mistake of overlooking some substantial part of the record, the provisions of law, etc. The question that arises is as to whether the age-old contention that the corrective action must essentially be sought from the higher Court of Appeal alone advances the interests of justice or whether if such corrective action is asked for within the prescribed time and it appears just and reasonable that the very Court itself should review and set right its order. This short issue has been canvassed before me by learned Counsel on a set of facts that are virtually not in dispute.

(2.) CERTAIN tenancy proceedings came to be decided by the Tahsildar, deogad, after which an appeal was filed against his order. The matter went right upto the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, in the first instance, and came to be remanded to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Ratnagiri Division, Ratnagiri, as the evidence had not been correctly appreciated. On the second round, when the matter came up to the MRT in revision as the Sub-Divisional Oflbcer had declared the opposite party to be a protected tenant, the revision came to be allowed and the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Ratnagiri Division, dated 6-7-1977 was set aside and the order of the Tahsildar, Deogad, dated 31-12-1975 was restored. Within a period of hardly three days, the tenant filed a review application, dated 3-8-1978 and the basic contention was that the maharashtra Revenue Tribunal had virtually overlooked a certain important fact in the evidence that the document on which reliance had been placed had virtually been misconstrued in this context and that, consequently, a grave error had resulted. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal entertained the application and the very same Member, by his order, dated 12-2-1981, reversed his earlier decision. He held that certain material evidence had been overooked, that on a proper and correct appraisal of the same the earlier decision of allowing the revision application was incorrect and, therefore, set aside the earlier order, dated 31-7-1978 and remanded the proceedings to the Subdivisional officer for a de novo hearing. It is against this order that the present two writ petitions have been filed. The tenant has challenged it on the ground that once the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the revision application should not have been allowed, that there was no need to disturb the earlier order of the Sub-Divisional Officer and, consequently, on the ground that the litigation having gone on for such a long period of time that there was really no scope for any new or further evidence in respect of a fact as has to date back to 1973 and that, consequently, the remand was unjustified. The opposite party has also assailed the order of the maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on an entirely different ground, namely, that there was no scope in law for the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal to have (1) Mah LRJ D. S. Rege v. A. D. Puralkar 399 entertained a review petition and even if this had been done, that it does not contemplate reappreciation of evidence and the arriving a t of a decision that is diametrically opposed to the earlier one. In substance, it was contended that the entire procedure was legally perverse in so far as the forum has virtually sat in appeal over its earlier judgment.

(3.) SHRI Datar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the original owner in Writ Petition No. 1319 of 1981 has taken me through the earlier order of the Tribunal, dated 31-7-1978 and contended that this order is perfectly correct and justified. He stated that the parties were represented by lawyers and further more that all relevant issues had not only been argued but that they had been decided and that under these circumstances the application, which was in substance one for reappreciation of evidence, was legally unjustified and, in fact, totally barred. Shri Datar enunciated the principles that are now well-settled with regard to the powers of review that are embodied in Order XLVII. Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and he stated that even where new material or new grounds, provisions of law or judicial decisions are sought to be made the grounds for review that the condition precedent is that it is necessary to satisfy the Court in-spite of due diligence it was not possible for the party to adduce this before the Court in the first instance. Essentially he emphasised the principle that the system of getting wise after the event or moving the Court by way of review petition is an after thought is not contemplated as there is a degree of finality to decisions which cannot be re-opened merely because one is ingenious enough to cull out a seemingly profound ground. He placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme court in the case of A. T. Sharma v. A. P. Sharme, AIR 1979 SC 1047. wherein the Supreme Court disapproved of a review that had been permitted by the High Court. While holding that in appropriate cases, it was certainly competent for the High Court to exercise powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to correct its own order if the circumstances justify and if it came within the scope of Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure the grounds on which the review had been permitted in that case, namely that one petition should have been filed, etc. , were clearly unjustified. Shri datar submitted that in sum and substance if one were to scrutinize the subsequent order, dated 12-3-1981 even though it is passed by the very same member that it constitutes a simple re-appreciation of evidence which can only be done by an appellate authority. In these circumstances, he maintained that the order in question is liable to be quashed.