HINDUSTAN CIBA GEIGY LIMITED Vs. PRAKASH CHANDAR JUNEJA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE question has offen been canvassed as to what precisely is the status of a final order passed by a Court during the intervening period when an appeal or further proceedings challenging that order is pending before a superior Court. It is necessary to clear the air with regard to this relatively elementary issue as it has arisen in this and also several other proceedings.

(2.) CRIMINAL Appeal No. 92 of 1986, filed by the present petitioner, M/s Hindustan Ciba-Geigy Ltd. , came to be disposed of by judgment and order dated 19-4-1993. The original accused, who was the respondent to that proceeding and to the present one, came to be convicted of an offence punishable under section 630 of the Companies Act, 1956. The operative part of the order reads as follows :-

(3.) THE Accused thereafter preferred Special Leave Petition (S. L. P.) No. 1305 of 1993 to the Supreme Court which came up for admission on 20-8-1993. The present petitioner-Company was represented before the Supreme Court on that day, but notice was required to be issued to the State of Maharashtra. The Court accordingly issued notice stating that the matter will be disposed of finally at this stage itself. The notice was made returnable on 8-10-1993. It is relevant to point out that the petitioner had prayed for interim stay of proceedings in so far as this Court had directed the Magistrate to quantify the fine amount payable starting from 1-4-1977 at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per month and to levy the fine in question. The order passed by the Supreme Court very clearly states : "notice returnable on 8-10-93. Meanwhile the petitioner shall not be dispossessed. " Undisputedly, there was no stay with regard to the levy of the fine and the only order passed by the Supreme Court was with regard to handing over of possession. I need to also record that the Supreme Court did not use the term "ad-interim"or "interim" order nor did it use the expression "until further orders", but the learned Judges were clear about limiting the order for a specified period upto 8-10-93 which was why the word "meanwhile" was used. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the present petitioner, Shri Vashi, who states that he was present before the Supreme Court when the matter was heard, makes a statement at the Bar that the learned Judges of the Supreme Court very specifically told the respondents Counsel that there was no stay as regards the fine and that the same must be paid. The S. L. P. thereafter reached for hearing on 15-10-1993, but for want of time has been adjourned to 19-11-1993. The original order dated 20-8-1993 has not been modified nor has any further order been passed by the Supreme Court in the proceeding.