VIMLA DEVI G MAHESHWARI Vs. S K LAUL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner has challenged an order dt. 18th February, 1993 being a de novo order under s. 269ud of the IT Act, 1961 under which for reasons recorded in that order, respondents 1 and 2 exercised their power to purchase the petitioners property being Flat No. 1, on the first floor of avanti Building Off Netaji Subhash Road Bombay-400 002.

(2.) THE petitioner entered into an agreement dt. 1st of August, 1987, with the 3rd respondent under which the petitioner had agreed to sell the above flat to the 3rd respondent for a sum of Rs. 23 lakhs. This was the subject-matter of an earlier order of purchase under s. 269ud dt. 23rd september, 1987. This order was challenged in WP No. 3290 of 1987. The petition was admitted and a stay of the order of 23rd September, 1987 was granted in terms of the Minutes dt. 7th october, 1987. The writ of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of C. B. Gautam vs. Union of India reported in (1992) 108 CTR (SC) 304 : (1992) 199 ITR 530 (SC ). The High court directed the appropriate authority to comply with the directions of the Supreme Court relating to granting a hearing to the petitioner before passing an order under s. 269ud and giving reasons for the order. Accordingly, the matter was remanded to the appropriate authority. The petitioner received a show-cause notice dt. 18th of January, 1993, asking the petitioner to show-cause why an order should not be made under s. 269ud (1 ). Respondents 1 and 2 also furnished to the petitioner the reasons which were recorded while passing the earlier order of 23rd September, 1987. Thereafter a hearing was given to the petitioner impugned order giving reasons, has been passed on 18th February, 1993.

(3.) THE present petition challenges the second order of 18th February, 1993. The petitioner contends that this order deserves to be set aside because it discloses non-application of mind and also because it is an erroneous order. It is contended by Mr. Dastur, who appears on behalf of the petitioner, that the instances of sale which are relied upon by the Department are not comparable instances and also because the two instances which were cited by the petitioner have been ignored in the order. We find from the order that the appropriate authority has in its order critically examined the three instances which were relied upon by the Department. The appropriate authority has noted the location of these flats as also the purchase price which was paid for these flats, although they were sold much earlier. The appropriate authority has also dealt with the two instances which were relied upon by the petitioner. It has held that even in respect of the instances of a sale of flat in Thakur Niwas, which is relied upon by the petitioner, the rate is Rs. 2,075 per sq. ft. as against the rate of Rs. 1,735 per sq. ft. in the case of the petitioner. The authority has further observed that in respect of the sale of a flat in the Rajhans building, (the second instance relied upon by the petitioner), the petitioner has not given any particulars and hence this instance is of no assistance. The petitioner contends that the sale of this flat in Rajhans Building was approved by respondents 1 and 2 and hence they ought to have the particulars of this sale with them. In our view, when the petitioner was relying upon any sale instance, the petitioner should have furnished some particulars of that sale. We have to remember that the hearing which the Supreme Court has directed to be given is a hearing in a limited time frame looking to the scheme of Chapter XX-C. Hence, any elaborate inquiry extending over a long period of time is not contemplated; not any detailed adducing of evidence which may take a considerable length of time. The Supreme Court itself has observed in the above case that looking to the time frame within which the order has to be passed, what is possible is limited or summary inquiry, the whole purpose being to enable the petitioner to put forth his case before the Department as to why a purchase order should not be made. The hearing opportunity for example, would enable the petitioner to point out why the price was appropriate. He can also point out any special circumstances in which a lower price has been agreed upon. It was therefore, for the petitioner to adduce appropriate material in support of his contention. He cannot contend that the Department should search its records pertaining to some other case to gather particular for the benefit of the petitioner. We also do not find any application by the petitioner for the production of any records. The appropriate authority has considered the material produced by the petitioner. The grievance, therefore, of the petitioner in the present case that the comparable sale instance have not been taken into account or have not been properly considered does not appear to be justified.