REGIONAL DIRECTOR EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE Vs. SHASHIKANT ARIKHINDI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The respondent Shri Shashikant Anikhindi, who carried on business in the name and style of M/s. Crown and King Company at Adhyaru Industrial Estate, Sun Mills Compound, Lower Parel, Bombay, filed and application under section 75 of the Employees State Insurance Act, before the Employees Insurance Court. It appears from the record that on 14th of March, 1978 neither the applicant nor his Advocate remained present in Court, therefore, the Employees Insurance Court dismissed his application. The applicant Shashikant Anikhindi then filed an application for setting aside the order of dismissal and for restoration of his application on 28th April, 1978 which was beyond the period of limitation as prescribed by Rule 26 of the Bombay Employees Insurance Court Rules, 1959. This application was dismissed by the industrial Court vide order dated 29th of June, 1978. Being aggrieved by the said order the applicant Shashikant filed a First Appeal before this Court bearing First Appeal No. 80 of 1979 which was heard and decided by S.K. Desai, J., vide judgment dated 10th of July, 1978. Desai, J., held that the trial Court was wrong in coming to the conclusion that it had no power to condone the delay of 14 days in filing the application for restoration. He also held that the applicant has shown sufficient cause for such delay and also for remaining absent on the date of hearing. Therefore, exercising the powers of the Appellate Court Desai, J., set aside the impugned order dated 29th June, 1978 and restored the application to file. It is this order in the First Appeal No. 80 of 1979 dated 10th July, 1979 which is challenged in this letters patent appeal by the appellants.

(2.) Shri Jayakar the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants Corporation contended before us that the Employees Insurance Court is a domestic Tribunal and is not a Court in the strict sense of the term, and therefore, the provisions of Limitation Act are not applicable to the applications filed under Rule 26 of the Rules. In substance he contended that the Employees Insurance Court is not a Court within the meaning of section 5 or section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and therefore, the learned Single Judge wrongly applied the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act to the said proceedings. In support of this contention he has relied upon the decision of this Court in (M/s. Popular Process Studio and another v. Employees State Insurance Corporation through Regional Director) A.I.R 1970 Bombay 413, wherein it was held that the Employees Insurance Court is not a Court for the purposes of Limitation Act.

(3.) It is not possible for us to accept this contention of Shri Jayakar. In M/s. Popular Process Studios case Bal, J., was mainly concerned with the question as to whether, Article 137 of the Limitation Act was applicable to the applications filed before the Employees Insurance Court under section 75(2) of the Act and for deciding that limited controversy Bal, J, came to the conclusion that the Employees Insurance Court is not a Court in a strict sense of the term. In the said case applications were filed under section 72 of the Act for a period prior to 1964. Before the amending Act of 1966, no limitation was prescribed for such applications. Now by section 77(1-A) a period of 3 years from the date on which the cause of action arose is proscribed for filing such applications. Further much water has flown after the decision in M/s. Popular Process Studios case. It also appears that attention of the Court was not drawn towards the decision of the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1494 (Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. The Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. and another) Further the law on the subject is now authoritatively laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in A.I.R. 1976 Bombay 143 (Bapusaheb Patil and others v. The State of Maharashtra and others) and, therefore, it will have to be held that the law laid down in M/s. Popular Process Studios case is no more good law. Further in this case we are not concerned with the question as to whether provisions of the Limitation Act will apply to the substantive applications filed under section 75 of the Act. In this appeal we are mainly concerned with the question as to whether section 5 of the Limitation Act will apply to application filed under Rule 26 of the said Rules for restoration of the application and we propose to confine our judgment to this limited area and do not propose to decide any wider question.