VINOD KUMAR GOSALIA Vs. FRANK SILVA LOBO NORTON

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioners challenge by way of this writ petition the orders dated February 28, 1979 and August 3, 1983, passed by the Rent Controller, Margao and the Administrative Tribunal, respectively, whereby the eviction proceedings instituted against them by the first and second respondents had been stopped and the petitioners had been ordered to put the landlords/first and second respondents in possession of the suit premises within thirty days from the day of the order.

(2.) THE case of the petitioners is that the first and second respondents have instituted eviction proceedings against them on the ground that they had failed to pay rents as well as on the ground that the leased premises had been kept closed and thereby damaged. In the course of the proceedings, the first and second respondents moved an application under Section 32(4) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease. Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968, (hereinafter called the Act for the sake of brevity) and prayed that the proceedings be stopped and the petitioners be ordered to hand over vacant possession of the rented premises. The petitioners had shown cause against the said eviction, but by the impugned order dated February 28, 1979 the learned Rent Controller, Margao, was pleased to allow the application and order their eviction. An appeal was filed by the petitioners against the aforesaid order of the Rent Controller and this appeal was dismissed by the Administrative Tribunal by the impugned judgment dated August 3, 1983. The petitioners contend that the impugned orders are vitiated in as much as the Courts below had not considered the effect of the amendment of Section 22 of the Act and the effect thereof on the provisions of Section 32 of the Act. Besides, the petitioners submit that no notice under Section 22(2) of the Act was served on them and, as such, the whole proceeding is vitiated. It is further the case of the petitioners that as per the amended section only the deposit ot arrears of legally recoverable rents is mandatory, that is to say, only rents due for three years prior to the filing of the proceedings can be recovered. Therefore, the rents to be deposited under Section 32 of the Act are only the rents which are legally recoverable and not any rents in excess thereof that may be due.

(3.) DEALING with the above contentions of Mr. Usgaoncar, Mr. J. Dias, learned Counsel appearing for the first and second respondents, submitted that the aforesaid rulings of the Madhya Pradesh High Court are good law in respect of the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Act, but definitely are not applicable and are not attracted to a case arising out of the provisions of our Act. He invited my attention to the provisions of Section 22(2)(a) of the Act as it stood before the amendment. He submitted that prior to the amendment the aforesaid provision of law was speaking about arrears in the payment of rent due by the tenant in respect of the building for a total period of three months, without specifying whether that total period of three months was of three months of recoverable rent or of a period of three months of arrears of rent which were due at any time. Then, Mr. Dias further submitted that, by way of the amendment, a clarification was given so as to restrict this period of three months only to the rents which were recoverable. Mr. Dias further invited my attention to Sub -section (3) to Section 22 of the Act as amended and submitted that the legislature has clearly taken a different stand and has not required the payment or deposit of the legally recoverable rent. On the contrary, Sub -section (3) which was introduced by the same amendment is in line with the language adopted in Section 32 of the Act, the reason being that in Section 22(2) (a) of the Act, the cause of action is spoken of, whereas in Sub -section (3) of Section 22 (introduced by the amendment) a benefit is given to the tenant to avoid the eviction by way of paying all the rents due. In the circumstances, Mr. Dias submitted that the scheme of our Act is entirely different and, therefore, the rulings of the Madhya Pradesh High Court relied upon by Mr. Usgaoncar are not attracted and the Administrative Tribunal has correctly relied upon in the ruling of the Supreme Court in the said case of Khadi Gram Udyog Trust v. Shri Ram Chandraji Virajman Mandir (supra).