STATE OF MAHARASHTRA Vs. PREMCHAND KUBCHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE question which arises in this appeal ia whether Section b clause (b) of the Suppression, of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act (Act 104 of 1956) applies only to the prostitute herself 01 whether it also applies to those others who solicit a person for the purpose of prostitution.

(2.) ON the night of the 7th of December 1961, Inspector Patkar and Sub-Inspector Mehta of the Vigilance Branch were accosted by the respondent with a suggestive inquiry as to whether he could be of any use to them. Sub-Inspector Mehta asked the respondent as to what he could do for him, and on the respondent saying that he could supply a girl for Rs. 40/- for the night, the two Police Officers disclosed their identity and put the respondent under arrest. The respondent was thereafter put up for trial before the learned Presidency Magistrate, 4th Court. Bombay for an offence under Section 8 (b) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, which will hereinafter be referred to as the Act. The learned Magistrate has accepted the evidence of the Police Officers and has held on a question of fact that the respondent did offer a girl for prostitution to Sub-Inspector Mehta. The learned Magistrate, has, however, acquitted the respondent as he took the view that clause (b) of Section 8, like clause (a) thereof, applies only to the prostitute herself. The learned Magistrate observes that it may have been possible to convict the respondent under some other provision of the Act, but he holds that as the respondent is not the prostitute herself and as the respondent has only accosted the Police Officers in order to induce them to go to a prostitute, no offence can be said to have been committed under clause (b) of Section 8 of the Act. Being aggrieved by the order of acquittal, the State has filed this appeal.

(3.) SECTION 8 of the Act reads thus: "whoever, in any public place or within sight of, and in such manner as to be seen or heard from, any public place, whether from within any building or house or not (a) by words, gestures, wilful exposure, of her person (whether by sitting by a window or on the balcony of a building or house or in any other way), or otherwise tempts or endeavours to tempt, or attracts or endeavours to attract the attention of, any person for the purpose of prostitution; or (b) solicits or molests any person, or loiters or acts in such manner as to cause obstruction or annoyance to persons residing nearby or passing by such public place or to offend against public decency- for the purpose of prostitution, shall be punishable on first conviction with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both and in the event of a second or subsequent conviction, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, and also with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees. " the question which falls for determination is as to what is the true construction of the words: "whoever solicits any person for the purpose oi prostitution. " The argument which found favour with the learned Magistrate and the argument which has been canvassed before us on behalf of the accused is that since clause (a) of Section 8 can apply only to the prostitute herself, the application of clause (b) must be restricted similarly. It may perhaps be correct, though we do not feel called upon to decide the question, that clause (a) of Section 8, is capable of application only to the prostitute, particularly in view of the words "wilful exposure of her person" and also because of the context in which the words in the parenthesis are used. The question howeyer is, whether there is any justification for construing tha language of clause (b) of Section 8 so as to restrict its operation in a manner similar to the one in which the operation of clause (a) appears to have been restricted. In our opinion, the words used in clause (b) of Section 8 must be given their plain, grammatical meaning and there is no warrant for restricting the operation of that clause so as to make it applicable only to prostitutes. If the charging words make it penal for "whoever" to solicit any person for the purpose of prostitution, there would be no justification for rutting down the ambit of those words by excluding from their scope all persons except the prostitute herself.