RANCHHOD RAVJI Vs. STATE OF BOMBAY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner is an employee of the weaving department of the night shift of the third respondent Mills. It appears that on March 21, 1950, a settlement was arrived at with the Mills with regard to the change-over of workers in the weaving department in the day shift and the night shift. On January 30, 1952, a notice was given by respondent No. 4 terminating this settlement. Respondent No. 4 Is the representative labour Union of respondent No. 3 Mills. On July 29, 1952, the Mills gave a notice of the termination of the settlement of the change-over and on July 30, 1952, a settlement was arrived at between respondent No. 3 and respondent No. 4 discontinuing the changeover of the workers of the day shift to the night shift, and this arrangement was registered under the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. It appears that the petitioner and all the other employees of the night shift were not members of respondent No. 4 labour Union and they made a grievance to the Government that the settlement arrived at between respondent No. 4 and respondent No. 3 was not a fair settlement as far as the night shift workers were concerned. Thereupon the Government Issued a notification under Section 72 of the Industrial Relations Act referring to the Industrial Tribunal the dispute between the employees of the weaving department of the day shift and the employees of the weaving department of the night shift. When the matter came before the Industrial Court, the Industrial Court realised the difficulty of respondent No. 4 representing all the workers of the Mills, and therefore it directed that an assessor should be appointed to represent the night shift workers. Government had referred not only this dispute concerning the third respondent Mills but of other Mills, and this order of the Tribunal was made with regard to all the Mills and the order was made on April 25, 1953. An application for. review was made before the Tribunal and the Tribunal came to the conclusion on June 5, 1953, that the order it had passed on April 25, 1953, did not apply to the Mills with regard to which registered settlements were in operation, and it took the view that in view of the registered settlement of July 30, 1952, it had no jurisdiction to arbitrate upon the dispute of the workers of the third respondent Mills. It is against this order that this petition is presented under Art. 226 of the Constitution, and the question that we have to consider is whether the fact that there is a registered settlement with regard to the dispute referred to the Tribunal by Government, debars the Tribunal from adjudicating upon that dispute.

(2.) NOW, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal arises under Section 37 of the Act and that jurisdiction is set out in the following terms : "it shall be the duty of the Industrial Court" -- (and the relevant clause is clause (vi) -- "to decide Industrial disputes referred to it under sections 71, 72, 73 or 73a". It is not disputed that what is referred to the Industrial Court is an industrial dispute. It is also not disputed that it is referred to it by Government under Section 72. The view taken by the Industrial Court is that the fact that there is a registered agreement or settlement between the Mills and respondent No. 4 precludes the Tribunal from deciding the dispute and giving an award in respect of that dispute. The position of a registered Union is dealt with in Section 30 of the Act, and that section provides that

(3.) THE Advocate General has attempted to argue that notwithstanding the clear language used by the Legislature, not only those who were members of the Union at the date of the agreement or settlement, but even those who were not members were bound by the settlement, and the argument is that because under Section 30 a Representative Union can enter into a settlement on behalf of all employees, all employees are bound by the same. In our opinion the contention of the Advocate Central is entirely untenable. As already pointed out, Section 30 is purely procedural. It gives the right to the Representative Union to enter into a settlement. But the mere fact that the Union is given the right to enter into a settlement does not mean that by its act it binds even those who were not members of the Union, and Section 114 makes it perfectly clear that only two classes of persons are bound when a Representative Union enters into a settlement, (1) those who were members of the union at the date of the settlement, and (2) those who become members of the union thereafter. Therefore, the agreement or settlement does not in any way affect those persons who were not members of the union, nor would it affect those persons who may become employees subsequently and yet may not become members of the union. If the Advocate General's contention were correct, it would lead to this extraordinary result that an employee who was not a member of the Union would be bound by a settlement and if that settlement was not for any specified period the settlement would continue in perpetuity without that employee having any right whatsoever to have his grievances redressed because under Section 116 (1) once a registered agreement or settlement has been arrived at, it ceases to have effect on the date specified therein, and if no date is specified therein, on the expiry of the period of two months from the date on which notice in writing to terminate such agreement, settlement or award, as the case may be, is given in the prescribed manner by any of the parties thereto to the other party. Therefore, it is only the Mills or the Representative Union that could give a notice terminating this agreement because no date is specified in this agreement.