MAHALAXMI MILLS LTD Vs. F JEEJEEBHOY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal from a judgment of Mr. Justice Desai and it raises a very short point as to the construction of Section 33a of the Industrial Disputes Act.

(2.) THE few facts which are necessary in order to appreciate the contentions put forward are that the Industrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947) was applied to Saurashtra with certain modifications on March 20, 1948, by the Saurashtra Ordinance No. VI of 1948. On March 13, 1950, a tribunal was set up at Rajkot under Section 7 of the Ordinance. On May 20, 1950, the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act came into force and on March 16, 1951, a reference was made by the Saurashtra Government under Section 10 of the Ordinance in respect of a dispute pending between the petitioners and their employees. On September 1, 1952, the petitioners stopped working the Mills, and between October 10, 1952, and October 15, 1952, the employees made various applications under Section 33a. On November 25, 1952, the tribunal made an award on the applications made by the employees under Section 33a. There was an appeal both by the employees and the Mills against this award to the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the Labour Appellate Tribunal gave its decision on May 7, 1953.

(3.) NOW, what is challenged before us is that the tribunal set up by the Saurashtra Government had no jurisdiction to entertain an application by an employee under Section 33a of the Act. When the Industrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947) was passed it did not contain Section 33a, and when that Act was applied to Saurashtra it also did not contain that provision. That provision was introduced into the main Act by the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. That Act set up an Appellate Tribunal in order to bring about uniformity of labour decisions all over India, and Section 7 of that Act provided for the jurisdiction to be exercised by that Appellate Tribunal. Section 34 of the Act introduced certain amendments in Act XIV of 1947 and those amendments were specified in the Schedule 'to the Act, and one of the amendments was Section 33a. Section 33a gave an important right to the employee which he did not possess under the old law, and the effect of Section 33a was that if an employer made any illegal change while a reference was pending before a tribunal, any employee aggrieved by such a change could complain to the tribunal and the tribunal was given the power to adjudicate upon that complaint. Prior to that amendment an employee could not make such a complaint. He had to ask Government to refer that complaint to a tribunal. Therefore, Section 33a gave the right to an employee, instead of being compelled to go to Government, to make a complaint 'suo motu' before the tribunal before which the main reference was pending. It was under this amended section that the employees of the petitioners made an application to the tribunal. Their contention was that while the reference made by the Saurashtra Government in respect of the disputes between the petitioners and the employees was pending, the petitioners closed the Mills and therefore they were guilty of an illegal change, and that complaint was adjudicated upon by the tribunal and an award was given in respect of that complaint.