STATE OF MAHARASHTRA Vs. NILKANTH SHRIPAD BHAVE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application by the State of Bombay to expunge certain remarks made by the Sessions Judge, North Satara, when dealing with a bail application. The remarks that were made by the Sessions Judge were about the learned Magistrate before whom the criminal case was pending, and the Question that has to be considered by this full bench is whether there is any jurisdiction in this Court to entertain this application. This application is neither an appeal nor a criminal revision application. No effective order has been passed by the Sessions Judge which can be complained of by any party, nor is there any finding given by the learned Sessions Judge which can be challenged in this Court, and the question that arises for our consideration is whether this Court has jurisdiction first to entertain an application which is neither an appeal nor a revision, and, if it has such jurisdiction, whether it has further the jurisdiction to expunge remarks from the judgment of the lower Court.

(2.) TURNING to the Criminal Procedure Code, it is not disputed by the Advocate General that this application does not fall either under Section 435 or Section 439. Clearly the Court is not called upon to exercise its revisional jurisdiction, but what is urged upon us is that we should exercise the Jurisdiction conferred upon us under Section 561a, Criminal P. C. The Privy Council in two decisions in -- 'emperor v. Nazir Ahmed', AIR 1945 PC 18 (A) and in -- 'jairam Das v. Emperor', AIR 1945 PC 94 (B) has taken the view that Section 561a does not confer any new power upon the High Court. It merely safeguards all powers which already existed In the High Court. Section 561a gives the power to the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. One possible view that can ' toe taken of Section 561a is that if a proceeding is properly before this Court, then the High Court may pass any order which is not contemplated by Criminal P. C. provided it is passed for the purpose mentioned in that section. To take such a view of our powers, may in conceivable cases, lead to irreparable harm being clone and the High Court being put in a position where it could not give redress and do justice. Take a very familiar case of a lawyer or a stranger to the proceedings being unjustly and severely criticized by a Magistrate. Remarks may be made by him which may affect his reputation and he may require redress at the hands of the High Court. But if the view was that the High Court could only act under Section 561a provided a proper application was made to it, proper in the sense that it was contemplated by other sections of Criminal P. C. , then such a lawyer or a stranger to the proceedings could get no redress at all from this Court, because if he were to make an application to us, he would be met with this answer chat his application is neither an appeal nor a revision nor is it an application contemplated by Criminal P. C. Therefore, in our opinion, as Section 561a was enacted to emphasise the fact that the High Court has the widest jurisdiction to pass orders to secure the ends of justice, Section 561a must give the power to this Court to entertain applications which are not contemplated by Criminal P. C. Therefore, if the High Court feels that ends of justice require that an order should be made in an application, although the application is not contemplated by the Code, the High Court will entertain the application and make the necessary orders to secure the ends of justice.

(3.) THE other question that arises for our consideration is, assuming this application is maintainable and we have jurisdiction to entertain it, has the Court an inherent power to amend or alter the judgment of a lower Court? In this case the Sessions Judge has delivered a certain judgment. In that judgment he has passed strictures against the Magistrate. The State comes before us and asks us to alter or amend that judgment by deleting from it certain portions to which it takes exception or by expunging certain portions from that judgment. The important question that arises is whether a superior Court has inherent power to alter the record, as it were, by changing or altering a judgment which has already been delivered and has become final as far as that particular Court is concerned. It is difficult to understand how such an inherent power can possibly arise in a superior Court. A Judgment of a lower Court may be wrong; it may even be perverse. The proper way to attack that judgment is by bringing it under the scrutiny of the superior Court and getting the judgment of the lower Court judicially corrected. But is it proper for the superior Court to alter or amend the judgment which has already been delivered? In our opinion, the inherent power that the High Court possesses is, in proper cases, even though no appeal or revision may be preferred to this Court, to judicially correct the observations of the lower Court by pointing out that the observations made by the Magistrate were not justified or were without any foundation or were wholly wrong or improper. The Advocate General says that making observations about the judgment of a lower Court stands on a different footing from expunging the remarks from the judgment. The Advocate General says that in gross cases the High Court must exercise its power to expunge the remarks and not merely in its judgment pass strictures against the lower Court. In our opinion, it is not necessary to express the displeasure of this Court against any observations made by a Magistrate or by a Sessions Judge by expunging the remarks from the judgment delivered by him. The English language is not lacking in proper vocabulary and the English language can be utilised by showing our displeasure in as strong terms as possible. In our opinion, therefore, it would not be correct to say that expunging remarks from a judgment or deleting passages from a judgment constitutes the inherent power of any superior Court and therefore the inherent power of the High Court.