A R SAVKUR Vs. AMRITLAL KALIDAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A very interesting question under the Arbitration Act arises in this appeal. The appellant engaged the respondents to effect certain transactions on the stock exchange. The respondents are brokers and members of the Bombay Native Share and Stock Brokers' Association. In respect of certain transactions the respondents made a claim upon the appellant. The appellant having failed to pay, at the instance of the respondents the matter was referred to arbitration. The appellant challenged the right of the arbitrators to go into matters which were in dispute between him and the respondents, and his contention was that the contract being a forward contract and not a ready contract for purchase and sale of shares, the contract was void, and therefore the agreement to refer the disputes to arbitration was also invalid and not binding.

(2.) NOTWITHSTANDING the objection of the appellant, the arbitrators proceeded with the arbitration and made and published their award on 21st June, 1952. The award was then filed in Court and the notice of the filing of the award was served on the appellant on 6th October, 1952. The appellant then filed a petition on 9th January, 1953, for a declaration that the award dated 21st June, 1952, was null and void and was not binding on the appellant. Mr. Justice Desai held that the petition having been made more than 30 days after the notice of the filing of the award having been served on the appellant it was beyond time and therefore dismissed the petition. It is from that order that this appeal is preferred.

(3.) NOW, if the contention of the appellant were sound, it would come to this that there would be two periods of limitation for two different applications, one under Section 30 and the other under Section 33. According to Mr. Mistree for the appellant, if an application to set aside an award were made under Section 30, the article in the Limitation Act which would apply is Article 158 and the period of limitation would be 30 days. If, on the other hand, the application for a declaration that the award is invalid without asking to set aside the award was made, then that application would be an application under Section 33 and the period of limitation would be three years under Article 181. But strangely enough, if that was the scheme of the Act and if the Legislature contemplated two different applications with two different periods of limitation under Section 30 and 33. Section 17 does not refer to any application under Section 33 at all. Therefore the curious result will be that the obligation upon the Court is only to wait till the period of limitation under Article 158 has expired and then it becomes incumbent upon the Court to proceed to pass a judgment upon the award, with the consequence that although a judgment upon the award has been passed under Section 17, the period of limitation to make an application to set aside the award having passed, it would still be open to the party adversely affected by the award to make an application under Section 33 and that application he could make right up to three years. In our opinion such a contention would not only be contrary to the scheme of the Act but it would result in anomalies which the Legislature could never possibly have contemplated. Therefore, the only proper interpretation to give to Section 17 is that it contemplates all applications to set aside an award and all applications to set aside an award filed under Section 33 and not under Section 30. Section 30 does not deal with applications to set aside an award at all. It deals with what the powers of the Court are when an application is made to set aside an award. But when we want to decide what is the right of a party to apply to set aside an award and what procedure, he should follow, then we have got to turn to Section 33.