APOLLO MILLS LTD Vs. BABUBHAI CHANDULAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THERE were disputes between the plaintiffs and the defendants in the year 1938 which were referred to the arbitration of Mr. T.V. Baddeley and Mr. Dewji Damodar. The arbitrators duly made and published their award on July 15, 1940. This suit is filed to enforce that award. The award is not challenged on its merits, but the contention is taken that the suit is not maintainable. This contention is based on the argument that the award haying been given on July 15, 1940, and the present Arbitration Act (X of 1940) having come into force on July 1, 1940, a suit on the award is barred under Section 17 of the Act. In order to decide that contention, the question that has got to be determined is whether this award is governed by the provisions of the new Act or by the provisions of the old Act which was repealed, by the new Act. Mr. M.S. Vakil for the defendants has relied on Section 48 of the new Act. Section 48 provides that all references pending at the commencement of the new Act are saved and the provisions of the new Act shall not apply to those pending references, and the law in force immediately before the commencement of the new Act shall apply to those pending references. The contention of Mr. Vakil is that all that is saved by Section 48 is pending references. Awards are not saved and therefore, when an award is made after the new Act came into force, it is governed by the provisions of the new Act. It is contended that the Legislature has advisedly not used the expression "award" in Section 48 and, therefore, it deliberately did not want to save awards made after the commencement of the Act from the provisions of the new Act. In my opinion this contention is clearly untenable.

(2.) AN award is the necessary and logical conclusion of a reference. What Section 48 says is that the new Act shall apply only to those references which commence after the date on which the Act comes into force. If there are any references pending on that date, the new Act shall not apply to those references. In my opinion the expression "references" is wide enough to cover the necessary and logical result of a reference, viz. an award. If Mr. Vakil's contention were to be correct, it would lead to this extraordinary result that while a pending reference would be saved from the application of the new Act, as soon as that reference terminated and the arbitrator made his award, the provisions of the new Act would apply to that award. The Legislature could never have intended such an extraordinary result. Therefore, in my opinion, any award which is the result of a reference which was pending at the date of the commencement of the Act is saved from the application of the new Act, and the provisions of the new Act do not apply to such an award.

(3.) I, therefore, answer the issue in the affirmative.