LAWS(BOM)-1943-10-3

DAKOR TEMPLE COMMITTEE Vs. SHANKERLAL

Decided On October 04, 1943
DAKOR TEMPLE COMMITTEE Appellant
V/S
SHANKERLAL Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application for revision of an order made by the District Judge, Nadiad, in a darkhast application made to enforce two decrees, one passed in Suit No.23 of 1880 and the other passed in Suit No.18 of 1887. The first suit was instituted under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code in the District Court at Ahmedabad against the sevaks or pujaris of the temple of Shri Ranchhodraiji at Dakor by some of the gors of the said temple and one M.G. Tambekar. There was a first appeal to the High Court which decided that the properties in suit were of a public, charitable and religious trust, that the sevaks were merely trustees and servants of the temple, and that they were accountable for all the properties in their hands. It directed the District Judge of Ahmedabad to take accounts, appoint a receiver, and frame a scheme for future management. (Manohar Ganesh Tambekar v. Lakshmiram Govindram (1887) I.L.R. 12 Bom. 247) THIS decree was confirmed by the Privy Council (Chotalal v. Manohar Ganesh Tambekar (1899) I.L.R. 24 Bom. 50 : s.c. 2 Bom. L.R. 516, P.C.). Suit No.18 of 1887 was also decided in the District Court at Ahmedabad. It was brought by the gors of the temple against the sevaks for a declaration of their rights and for an injunction. It was first instituted in the Court of the Second Class Subordinate Judge at Umreth. As the valuation exceeded Rs. 5,000, it was thereafter filed in the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge at Ahmedabad who had jurisdiction at that date over the Kaira and Panch Mahal Districts as well as the Ahmedabad District. Thereafter it was transferred to the Assistant Judge, and he decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs in 1888. There was a first appeal to the High Court which confirmed the original decree with slight modifications. (Kalidas Jivram v. Gor Parjaram Hirji (1890) I.L.R. 15 Bom. 309).

(2.) THE scheme which the District Judge had been directed to frame in Suit No.23 of 1880 having been framed by him, there were appeals to the High Court and the scheme was ultimately settled by the High Court and confirmed by the Privy Council in 1912. (Sevak Kirpashankar v. Gopalrao (1912) 15 Bom. L.R. 13, P.C.). Under the scheme the sevaks were removed from the management of the trust and a committee called the Dakor Temple Committee was appointed for the management of the trust property and the temple. Rules which were made by the Committee formed part of the scheme.

(3.) THE objections as to the jurisdiction of the Court have been dealt with by the learned District Judge in the following manner. THE first contention raised on behalf of the original opponents was that the decree sought to be. executed having been passed by the District Court, Ahmedabad, which at the date of the decree had jurisdiction over the Kaira District, the Court at Nadiad had no jurisdiction to entertain and hear the darkhast. THE learned District Judge has pointed out that in 1926 the territorial jurisdiction over the Kaira District which the Ahmedabad Court had was wholly conferred on the District Court of Kaira (wherein Dakor is situated) at Nadiad and that under the decision in Jagannath v. Ichharam (1925) 27 Bom. L.R. 649 the new Court would be deemed to be the Court which passed the decree as defined in Section 37 of the Code. He, therefore, held that the applicants were under no necessity to go to the Ahmedabad Court for executing the decree in their favour. THE learned District Judge has next held that the decree in Suit No.18 of 1887 must be deemed to be a decree of the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge and not of the District Court. His grounds for this conclusion are that it was filed in the First Class Subordinate Judge's Court at Ahmedabad and that the High Court disallowed the objection that the valuation in the suit was really made up of the value of different causes of action, each of value less than Rs. 5,000, so that the suit, though ultimately decided by the Assistant Judge, was a suit belonging to the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge. As to suit No.23 of 1880, which was a suit under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, he held that the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge of Nadiad was the proper Court for executing the decree owing to the fact that the Provincial Government had empowered that Court to entertain suits under Section 92 and in view of the provisions of Section 37 (b) of the Code defining the expression " Court which passed a decree. " THE material part of that section reads thus : THE expression ' Court which passed a decree,' or words to that effect, shall, in relation to the execution of decrees, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, be deemed to include (a)... (b) where the Court of first instance has ceased to exist or to have jurisdiction to execute it, the Court which, if the suit wherein the decree was passed was instituted at the time of making the application for the execution of the decree, would have jurisdiction to try such suit.