(1.) Heard Mr. Khan, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Kedar, learned Counsel for the respondents/MSRTC.
(2.) All these petitions raise a common question, as to whether the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of clause 49 of the 1956 settlement independently of clause 19 of the 1985 settlement and Resolution No.8856. In all these petitions, except for difference in the dates, rest of the plea is common and therefore they are being decided by this common judgment.
(3.) Mr. Khan, learned Counsel for the petitioners submits, that under clause 49 of the settlement of 1956, the petitioners were entitled to be placed on same time pay scale as of regular employees, on having completed 180 days of service with the respondent/MSRTC. Taking the facts in Writ Petition No.1747/2023 in hand, it is contended that the petitioner had completed 180 days as a daily wager on 31/12/1990, but was not taken on temporary time scale w.e.f 01/01/1991, but was on temporary time scale till 16/03/1992 and therefore was entitled to the difference in wages, prior to 16/03/1992. It is also claimed that the petitioner was thereafter placed in daily rated Group-II on 05/07/1996. The petitioner retired on 29/02/2020 and therefore it is claimed that the petitioner is entitled for the benefit of time scale from 01/01/1991 till his retirement. It is also contended that the various settlements, namely clause 49 of the 1956 settlement, Resolution No.8856 and clause 19 of the 1985 settlement operate in different arenas and therefore work independently of each other, in light of which, the learned Industrial Court could not have rejected the claim for the benefit of time scale to the petitioner. It is also contended that clause 49 of the 1956 settlement only relates to grant of regular time scale to a daily rated employee on having completed 180 days of continuous service and has nothing to do with any absorption. It is also contended that clause 19 of the 1985 settlement and also Resolution No.8856 relate to the absorption, and therefore have no bearing whatsoever upon the operation of clause 49 of the 1956 settlement as they both operate independent of each other. In that view of the matter, it is contended that the learned Industrial Court has misconstrued the position by placing reliance upon clause 19 of 1985 settlement for the purpose of considering the benefits available under clause 49 of the 1956 settlement and therefore the impugned judgment is liable to be quashed and set aside.