NAGPUR Vs. HONBLE MEMBER, INDUSTRIAL COURT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) ADMIT . Heard finally by consent of the parties. Shri N.S. Khubalkar, learned Assistant Government Pleader waives notice on behalf of respondent No.1 and Shri S.R. Bhongade, the learned Counsel waives notice on behalf of respondent No.2.

(2.) BY this appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, the appellant-Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Nagpur has questioned the judgment dated 07th September, 2011 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. 5121 of 2006. The learned Single Judge has dismissed the petition filed by the present appellant and upheld the order of the Industrial Court dated 17.12.2005 in Complaint (ULPN) No. 574 of 2002. The Industrial Court has found that the appellant-Market Committee has to pay subsistence allowance in accordance with the provisions of Clause 25 (5A) of Model Standing Orders framed under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 to its employee-respondent No.2. The Model Standing Orders and the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 are found applicable to the establishment of the appellant by construing definition of "industrial and other establishments" as contained in Payment of Wages Act, 1936 particularly Section 2(ii). It is not in dispute that the provisions of Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 apply to "industrial establishment" as defined in Section 2(e)(i) thereto and that definition, in turn, adopts the definition of "industrial or other establishments" as contained in Section 2(ii) of the Payment of Wages Act.

(3.) SHRI Uday Dastane, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, at the outset, pointed out that in absence of Model Standing Orders, the service regulations of appellant prescribe payment of only 50 per cent of the salary as subsistence allowance for entire length of period of suspension during pendency of departmental enquiry. The appellant has accordingly paid subsistence allowance. The proportionate increase therein to 75 per cent after expiry of initial 90 days and to 100 per cent after 180 days of suspension contemplated in Model Standing Orders is not relevant. The said stipulation in clause 25(5A) of Model Standing Orders is attracted only when the Model Standing Orders are found applicable and not otherwise. He submits that as interpretation of clause (f) in definition Section 2(ii) of Payment of Wages Act, 1936 in impugned judgment is unsustainable, said clause has no application.