(1.) BY this appeal, preferred under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996,(for short "the said Act "), the appellant is challenging the common order passed by the learned sole arbitrator in applications preferred by respondent Nos. 1 & 2 under Section 16 of the said Act.
(2.) BY the impugned order, learned Arbitrator, held that the claims contained in Paragraphs 41(i), 41(v)(a) to 41(v)(l), 42, 43, 44.1 44.2 44.3, and prayers contained in Paragraph 49 (a) and (b) thereof to the extent that they cover claims mentioned in the above said paragraphs are beyond the scope of arbitral reference and learned arbitrator has no jurisdiction to decide the same.
(3.) MR . Sen, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that for convenience, the respondents for the purpose of construction of Lucknow bypass referred to themselves as JV or PAJV. There is no legal entity independent of respondent Nos.1 & 2 and JV or PAJV merely refers to consortium or joint association. Similarly partnership firm of AAP Construction Company is not legal entity but is a mere compendious description of the appellant and respondents. He submitted that arbitration agreement between the parties was arrived at, as is evident from various documents. He submitted that the arbitration agreement between the parties also came to be recorded in order dated 9th December, 2011, passed by this Court. Mr. Sen, submitted that the earlier arbitrator wrongly limited the reference to the dispute between the partners of AAP and passed the award which was set-aside by this Court by consent and thereafter, parties once again have reached an agreement to refer the dispute between themselves for arbitration for de novo adjudication. He submitted that the reference which is referred by this Court is a fresh reference and not in continuation of the earlier reference which came to an end on earlier arbitrator rendering his award. He, therefore, insisted that the reference before the present arbitrator was in respect of all the disputes between the parties i.e. dispute between partners of AAP as well as disputes between PAJV and AAP. He lastly submitted that in these circumstances, the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set-aside.