LAWS(BOM)-2013-9-182

STATE OF MAHARASTRA Vs. SANTHOSH MARUTI MANE

Decided On September 21, 2013
State Of Maharastra Appellant
V/S
Santhosh Maruti Mane Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The accused, who stands convicted for an offence punishable under Sections 381, 302, 307, 324, 427 and 3(2) of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 and sentenced to R.I. for 5 years and to pay fine of Rs. 500/- in default R.I. for one month, sentence of death and fine of Rs. 5000/- in default, R.I. for one year, R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs. 5000/- in default R.I. for two months, R.I. for three years and fine of Rs. 5000/- in default, R.I. for one month, R.I. for 2 years and fine of Rs. 500/- in default R.I. for 15 days and R.I. for 5 years and fine of Rs. 5000/- in default, R.I. for two months, respectively, with a direction that the substantive sentences shall run concurrently, by the Additional Sessions Judge, Pune by Judgment dated 8.4.2013, has filed Criminal Appeal No. 421 of 2013, questioning the correctness of his conviction and sentence. In accordance with the provisions of Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Trial Court has made a reference to this Court for confirmation of the death sentence passed against the accused. Since both these proceedings arise from the same Judgment of the Trial Court, the Confirmation Case as well as the Criminal Appeal is being decided by this common Judgment.

(2.) In the light of the fact which has been brought to our notice by the learned Counsel for the Appellant, we need not advert to the evidence as well as decide the question of sustainability of the conviction of the accused at this stage. After we had heard the learned APP, the learned Counsel for the accused brought to our notice that the accused had not been heard on the point of sentence. Perusal of paragraph 146 of the Judgment discloses that the Trial Court in the light of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Allauddin Mian v/s State of Bihar, 1989 0 SCC(Cri) 490 was conscious of the requirement of hearing of the accused before pronouncement of the sentence. On that count the Judgment was deferred for hearing the prosecution and the accused on the point of sentence. The case was accordingly adjourned for 8.4.2013. The order sheet of 8.4.2013 indicates that the Counsel for the accused was present and the D.G.P. was also present. The accused had also been produced from Jail. The order sheet further records that arguments were heard on the point of sentence. Paragraph 147 of the Judgment discloses that the submissions of the learned Counsel for the accused and the learned Counsel for the D.G.P. were heard on the point of sentence. However, in the entire body of the remaining part of the Judgment, no reference is made as to what was submitted by the learned Counsel for the accused. The learned Counsel for the accused has urged before us that the accused in fact has not been heard and a right of adducing evidence if felt necessary by the accused has been denied to him. A reference at this juncture may be made to the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Santa Singh v/s. State of Punjab, 1977 MhLJ 1 The Supreme Court, while construing Section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly indicated that the said provision was mandatory and the Court was required to hear the accused on the question of sentence and then pass sentence according to law. The Supreme Court further held that noncompliance of Section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not a mere irregularity curable under Section 465 but was an illegality which vitiated the sentence.

(3.) The Judgment of the Supreme Court in Ajay Pandit alias Jagdish Dayabhai Patel and Anr. V/s. State of Maharashtra, 2012 8 SCC 43 has been brought to our notice. The Supreme Court referring to the earlier Judgment of the Supreme Court in Santa Singh , Dagdu and Ors. V/s. State of Maharashtra, 1977 3 SCC 68 Maniappan v/s. State of Tamil Nadu, 1981 3 SCC 11 Allauddin Mian V/s. State of Bihar, 1989 3 SCC 5 and Malkiat Singh V/s. State of Punjab, 1991 4 SCC 341 concluded at paragraph 46 of the Judgment by holding that the High Court had only mechanically recorded what the accused had stated and no attempt has been made to elicit any information or particulars from the accused or the prosecution which were relevant for awarding a proper sentence. The Supreme Court further held that no genuine effort had been made by the High Court to elicit any information either from the accused or the prosecution as to whether any circumstance exists which might influence the High Court to avoid and not to award death sentence.