CHANDRAKANT G MODI Vs. SHREE RAM MILLS LTD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution impugns an order dated 31.1.2003 passed by the Labour Court whereby the application of the petitioner-employee under sections 73 and 79 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 was partly allowed and the petitioner was granted the benefit of continuity of service from 25.2.1993-the date of dismissal, till 31.7.1996-the date of closure of the respondent mill. The respondent mill was also directed to pay 50% of back wages to the petitioner. The order of the Labour Court was affirmed by the Industrial Court in Appeal filed by the petitioner, which order is also impugned in these proceedings.

(2.) The only question therefore which arises for consideration before this Court is whether the petitioner ought to have been granted full back wages for the period 25th January, 1993 till 31st July, 1996. Now, the Labour Court has arrived at a finding of fact that the misconducts are proved which is confirmed by the Industrial Court in appeal. Considering the above and the limited challenge by the petitioner to the denial of full back wages before the Industrial Court in appeal and in these proceeding, it would neither be possible nor appropriate for this Court to go into the aspect of misconducts. In S.S. Sharma v. Union of India, 1981 LabIC 131 a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that the parties should ordinarily be confined to their specific written pleadings. It is an admitted position that the respondent mill is closed since 31.7.1996. The question therefore of reinstatement could not arise. The Labour Court therefore granted to the petitioner 50% back wages from 25th February, 1993-the date of dismissal, till 31st July, 1996-the date of closure of respondent mill. In the light of the above, I am unable to see any infirmity in the impugned orders. In my view, the grant of full back wages to the petitioner as claimed by him would tantamount to the petitioner going unpunished, despite the proved misconducts. Apart from the above, it is of significance to note that even in the application before the Labour Court, there is no averment made by the petitioner that he was not gainfully employed elsewhere. In these circumstances, in my view, the order of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court are unexceptionable and not liable to be interfered in exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court.

(3.) It is however sought to be argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Labour Court has granted 'continuity in service' and therefore the petitioner would be entitled to all benefits including VRS which has been granted to other workmen in the respondent mill, upon its closure. The learned Counsel in support of this submission has relied upon the following judgments: